A Russian built Mil17 flies over a troop carrier in Mullaitivu.
Showing posts with label terrorism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label terrorism. Show all posts
Saturday, February 7, 2009
Thursday, April 17, 2008
TERRORISTS PANIC OVER ARMS DEAL WITH SLOVAKIA
HERE's an interesting article from The Hindu
Panic in LTTE over arms deal with Slovakia: Colombo
B. Muralidhar Reddy
COLOMBO: Sri Lanka’s military on Wednesday claimed that at least 38 LTTE cadres and four soldiers were killed in fighting in the north while the Air Force said its jets bombed Tiger positions in the Muhamalai sector of Jaffna district.
According to a Defence Ministry statement, “counter-terrorist offensives” in the Jaffna and Wanni theatres killed 12 LTTE cadres and inured 8 others. On the Vavuniya front, troops engaged a terrorist bunker in the Navatkulama area with small arms and rocket propeller grenades (RPGs) last forenoon and claimed that two terrorists were killed, it said.
In another development, the government has claimed that there is “absolute panic” in LTTE circles over the “recent arms deal” with Slovakia. An Information Department report claimed that members of the Britain-based LTTE front organisation — British Tamil Forum (BTF) — protested in front of the Slovakian Embassy in London opposing the deal.
“A letter was handed over to Slovakian Diplomatic staff by Mr. Ivan Pedropillai a senior figure within the LTTE hierarchy in the United Kingdom and one of the LTTE’s main fundraisers who has generously funded most of the meetings organised by the BTF,” it said quoting unidentified sources.
Panic in LTTE over arms deal with Slovakia: Colombo
B. Muralidhar Reddy
COLOMBO: Sri Lanka’s military on Wednesday claimed that at least 38 LTTE cadres and four soldiers were killed in fighting in the north while the Air Force said its jets bombed Tiger positions in the Muhamalai sector of Jaffna district.
According to a Defence Ministry statement, “counter-terrorist offensives” in the Jaffna and Wanni theatres killed 12 LTTE cadres and inured 8 others. On the Vavuniya front, troops engaged a terrorist bunker in the Navatkulama area with small arms and rocket propeller grenades (RPGs) last forenoon and claimed that two terrorists were killed, it said.
In another development, the government has claimed that there is “absolute panic” in LTTE circles over the “recent arms deal” with Slovakia. An Information Department report claimed that members of the Britain-based LTTE front organisation — British Tamil Forum (BTF) — protested in front of the Slovakian Embassy in London opposing the deal.
“A letter was handed over to Slovakian Diplomatic staff by Mr. Ivan Pedropillai a senior figure within the LTTE hierarchy in the United Kingdom and one of the LTTE’s main fundraisers who has generously funded most of the meetings organised by the BTF,” it said quoting unidentified sources.
Monday, April 14, 2008
CANADA CRACKING DOWN ON TAMIL TERROR FUNDING
SIGNS are increasing that Canada's patience with LTTE backed illegal activity including drugs, guns and human smuggling on their territory is coming to an end. Two years after raiding the Tamil Rehab Organization, a well known source of overseas funding for the Tamil Tigers, the Royal Canadian Mounties have completely sealed off the premises.
Similar action is being taken in various parts of Europe and the US considers the TRO to be a terror financing outfit.
WTM (World Tamil Movement)'s mouthpiece refused to comment to media fearing a leak, reports day.
"...The president of the WTM's Ontario branch, Sitta Sittampalam, also declined to comment yesterday. "I was asked by my lawyer not to reveal anything on this matter," he said. "I'm not in a position to divulge anything."http://www.nationalpost.com/story.html?id=443481
Similar action is being taken in various parts of Europe and the US considers the TRO to be a terror financing outfit.
WTM (World Tamil Movement)'s mouthpiece refused to comment to media fearing a leak, reports day.
"...The president of the WTM's Ontario branch, Sitta Sittampalam, also declined to comment yesterday. "I was asked by my lawyer not to reveal anything on this matter," he said. "I'm not in a position to divulge anything."http://www.nationalpost.com/story.html?id=443481
Sunday, April 13, 2008
DEFINING GOOD AND BAD GUYS IN SRI LANKA..
..FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF A MID WESTERN AMERICAN PHYSICIAN
MY doctor finally decided it was time to quit his practice and retire on a beach. He certainly should be able to do so, given the lucrative practice he's had for decades.
Getting introduced to my new doctor was an eye opener. Younger Dr. Schneider was not the typical mid-westerner to whom 'world' meant the landscape from Florida to California. He even knew that there was more to the world. He even had heard of Sri Lanka and had an idea of what has been going on there. His first questions after inquiring where I was from gave me an idea of how simplistically the average American defined events and people in their world.
Dr. Schnieder wanted to know whether I was a 'Tamil Tiger'. I told him I was from 'the other side'. To that he responded ' ah, so you are one of the good guys'.
As we discussed more about the conflict in Sri Lanka, it was almost amusing to note how he debated within himself whether or not to accept my insistence that not all Tamils are terrorists. I even brought out the argument that not all cholesterol is bad, in order to convince him how easy it is to mistake one for the other, and the absolute necessity for clear understanding of the issue prior to passing judgement.
Given the amount of effort I put into convincing him that all Tamils are not terrorists, here's hoping that at least one American has learnt that all societies cannot be categorized along the lines of good and bad based on the actions of a few.
MY doctor finally decided it was time to quit his practice and retire on a beach. He certainly should be able to do so, given the lucrative practice he's had for decades.
Getting introduced to my new doctor was an eye opener. Younger Dr. Schneider was not the typical mid-westerner to whom 'world' meant the landscape from Florida to California. He even knew that there was more to the world. He even had heard of Sri Lanka and had an idea of what has been going on there. His first questions after inquiring where I was from gave me an idea of how simplistically the average American defined events and people in their world.
Dr. Schnieder wanted to know whether I was a 'Tamil Tiger'. I told him I was from 'the other side'. To that he responded ' ah, so you are one of the good guys'.
As we discussed more about the conflict in Sri Lanka, it was almost amusing to note how he debated within himself whether or not to accept my insistence that not all Tamils are terrorists. I even brought out the argument that not all cholesterol is bad, in order to convince him how easy it is to mistake one for the other, and the absolute necessity for clear understanding of the issue prior to passing judgement.
Given the amount of effort I put into convincing him that all Tamils are not terrorists, here's hoping that at least one American has learnt that all societies cannot be categorized along the lines of good and bad based on the actions of a few.
Saturday, April 12, 2008
LTTE CONTINUES TO BE LISTED UNDER FOREIGN TERROR GROUPS IN THE US
The LTTE is included in the Foreign Terrorist Organizations list published for the year by the US. A total of approx 44 groups hold the distinguished position, which makes them legitimate targets for US military action.
Released by the U.S. State Department, the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations has been prepared by the Washington-based Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) which continually monitors the activities of terrorist groups active around the world to identify potential targets.
The list also includes Al Qaeda, Abu Sayyaf Group, Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), Hamas, Palestine Liberation Front, Palestine Islamic Jihad and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
The LTTE and its operatives this year began a covert operation to support and fund the Hillary Clinton presidential campaign in the aftermath of a much publicized failure to bribe their way out of the terror group listing. A well planned and executed FBI sting operation netted teh LTTE operatives who attempted to bribe Federal officers to de-list the LTTE and also provide them with sophisticated arms to fight the Sri Lankan Defence Forces.
The Clinton campaign, which is suspected to have at least one prominant Tamil Tiger terror supporter amongst its ranks, decided to drop the funding from the group since they are 'currently listed as a terrorist group in the US'. Clinton is known to have made statements sympathetic towards the Tamil Tigers who have so far slaughtered over 70,000 people in Sri Lanka, assasinated Rajiv Gandhi and many others in India and continue to carry out a multitude of illegal and terrorist operations across the world. The LTTE has provided sophisticated weaponry and training to Al Quaida and other middle eastern terror groups, and continues to hold a contingent of child combatants in defiance of UN appeals for their release.
Released by the U.S. State Department, the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations has been prepared by the Washington-based Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) which continually monitors the activities of terrorist groups active around the world to identify potential targets.
The list also includes Al Qaeda, Abu Sayyaf Group, Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), Hamas, Palestine Liberation Front, Palestine Islamic Jihad and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
The LTTE and its operatives this year began a covert operation to support and fund the Hillary Clinton presidential campaign in the aftermath of a much publicized failure to bribe their way out of the terror group listing. A well planned and executed FBI sting operation netted teh LTTE operatives who attempted to bribe Federal officers to de-list the LTTE and also provide them with sophisticated arms to fight the Sri Lankan Defence Forces.
The Clinton campaign, which is suspected to have at least one prominant Tamil Tiger terror supporter amongst its ranks, decided to drop the funding from the group since they are 'currently listed as a terrorist group in the US'. Clinton is known to have made statements sympathetic towards the Tamil Tigers who have so far slaughtered over 70,000 people in Sri Lanka, assasinated Rajiv Gandhi and many others in India and continue to carry out a multitude of illegal and terrorist operations across the world. The LTTE has provided sophisticated weaponry and training to Al Quaida and other middle eastern terror groups, and continues to hold a contingent of child combatants in defiance of UN appeals for their release.
TRUE PROGRESS OR STALEMATE ?
Indian and other military research indicate a state of 'stalemate' in the anti-terror effort. In the absence of reliable situation reports it is becoming increasingly difficult to determine realistic progress.
Stalemates are bad. Over time they prove to be bloody and endless. Initiative only will break a stalemate and tip the status quo.
When it comes to initiative, the tigers have historically proven superior and more decisive in their actions. This time, the govt will have to shake itself into proactive action if not to be caught napping and checkmated.
Stalemates are bad. Over time they prove to be bloody and endless. Initiative only will break a stalemate and tip the status quo.
When it comes to initiative, the tigers have historically proven superior and more decisive in their actions. This time, the govt will have to shake itself into proactive action if not to be caught napping and checkmated.
Thursday, April 10, 2008
THREE SRI LANKAN PEACE KEEPERS SHOT IN HAITI
THREE Sri Lankan soldiers from the UN peace keeping contingent recieved non-life threatening injuries when fired upon by an unknown gunman in a slum area of Haiti.
Sri Lanka currently maintains a contingent of approx 900 soldiers in Haiti under a UN peace keeping mandate. Our soldiers proved their mettle by disarming most of the bandit and armed groups in the area under their control within a short time of their deployment.
Sri Lanka currently maintains a contingent of approx 900 soldiers in Haiti under a UN peace keeping mandate. Our soldiers proved their mettle by disarming most of the bandit and armed groups in the area under their control within a short time of their deployment.
Monday, March 31, 2008
MADONNA - ON PEACE TOUR IN SRI LANKA
THE ' MATERIAL GIRL' WANTS TO BRING A MESSAGE OF PEACE TO SRI LANKA
Grammy award winning singer and songwriter Madonna is to visit Sri Lanka next month for a peace concert and is also likely to visit the Wanni for what has been billed as a first of its kind meeting between the top international singer and the LTTE, organizers said.
The ‘Concert for Peace’ scheduled for May 17 in Colombo will also see several local artistes take the stage with the organizers assuring an unforgettable experience complete with a 120 piece backup band, laser lights and a fireworks display.Tickets are scheduled to go on sale from mid April and the Daily Mirror is the official print media sponsor for the gig. As part of the goodwill visit Madonna is due to visit Killinochchi and meet the LTTE leadership with a message of hope for peace in the near future.
“We have been given clearance to visit the Wanni with Madonna on humanitarian grounds,” the organizers said adding that more details of the concert and ticket prices would be made public soon.
Madonna's latest single "4 Minutes" featuring Justin Timberlake just recently entered the Billboard Hot 100 at No. 68, which the magazine reports is the 53rd time in her career she's appeared on that particular tally. [Source; Daily Mirror]
Will war lead to peace in Sri Lanka?
Ram Manikkalingam
Sri Lanka’s phoney peace is over. By abrogating the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, the Sri Lankan government has finally proclaimed what has been a reality for two years – the effective end of the ceasefire brokered by the Norwegians six years ago.
The Sinhala-dominated government and the Tamil Tigers have decided that war is not only inevitable but also required, before any fresh political process can emerge. President Mahinda Rajapaksa has promised to eradicate terrorism. His brother, Defence Secretary Gothabaya Rajapakse has promised to kill Velupillai Prabakaran, the leader of the Tamil Tigers. Scenting victory, the Sri Lankan military is pressing in on the Tiger heartland of the north on several fronts, while targeting Tiger leaders for assassination.
Meanwhile, the LTTE leader has proclaimed that only military force will work to change the government’s policy. He has directed attacks against hard military targets such as Air Force bases and soft political targets like ministers and civil guardsmen. The Tamil Tigers are using a combination of hit and run attacks, bombings and assassinations to deter and delay the government’s impending assault.
The Sri Lankan government has newly acquired armaments – multi-barrel rocket launchers, heavier artillery, precision guided missiles, and bunker busters – and has recruited 30,000 new recruits into its armed forces. The Tamil Tigers have developed an air wing, an effective sea wing, and have heavily infiltrated population centres in the Sinhala-dominated South. This next round of violence will lead to the deaths of thousands, the displacement of hundreds of thousands, and the destruction of property on a larger scale than what we have ever witnessed before in Sri Lanka.
The LTTE can emerge defeated, weakened, or emboldened from this fighting. The Tigers will be defeated if the government succeeds in ejecting them from territory they control and in eliminating their leadership. They will be weakened if the government ejects the Tigers from territory they control but they can still continue as an insurgent organisation capable of guerrilla operations and terrorist attacks. The LTTE will be emboldened, of course, if it succeeds in bringing the government offensive to a standstill. While these three scenarios are very different, the role that friends of Sri Lanka, in the region and outside, can play in helping to move the country towards a stable peace is the same in all of them.
The first scenario is the government deals a decisive blow to LTTE – ejecting it from territory it controls and eliminating its leadership. The hope, in this scenario, is that a Sri Lanka liberated from war will find the will to seek peace. Sinhala hardliners fearful of Tamil autonomy in LTTE hands will be less opposed to granting it after a Tiger defeat. Tamil hardliners seeking a separate state will stop doing so. This will create the opportunity for a new politics of co-existence among all communities on the island. But the fear is that military victory may instead embolden Sinhala hardliners to reject any concession to the minorities – Tamil and Muslim – compelling them to live at the sufferance of the majority. War will give way, not to peace and reconciliation, but to bitterness and recrimination. Sri Lanka may not have war but neither will it have a just peace.
The second scenario points to a weakened, though not defeated, LTTE. It is ejected from territory it controls, but continues as a formidable insurgent organisation capable of guerrilla operations and terrorist attacks. The hope here is that both parties will declare victory and call a truce. The government will view further efforts at defeating the LTTE as too costly, and the Tigers will accept that they cannot get what they want by military means alone. Each will give up on its preferred political objective. The government will give up on centralising all power in Colombo and the LTTE will give up on the establishment of a separate state. The result will be the classic federal compromise that most people see as the only reasonable solution. The fear is that neither party will have the political sagacity to stop at a partial victory or defeat. Rather the Sri Lankan government will press on in the hope of eliminating the LTTE permanently. And the Tamil Tigers will refuse to accept a new balance of power where they do not control territory and administer populations. Each side will seek to continue the war. Neither will prevail.
The final scenario is a bloody stalemate – where the government fails to eject the LTTE and the Tamil Tigers fail to make military headway themselves. The government will unleash all it has, but will not dislodge the LTTE from territory it controls. The Tamil Tigers will hold firm but they will not be able to expand their hold on territory or population. The result will be a stalemate, but after spilling a lot of blood. The hope is that after much cost to the people of the country the government and the Tamil Tigers will have relearned the lesson that war alone will not alter the political dynamic of the country. They will initiate a political process that will keep the strengths and redress the weaknesses of the previous one. This process, with a combination of internal acceptance and external support, will get somewhere. The fear in this scenario is that a combination of Sinhala extremism and political rivalry in the South and Tamil extremism and militarism in the North will prevent the parties from seizing the opportunity to move forward toward a fresh process. Instead, they will continue seeking military breakthroughs only to be further mired in a bloodier stalemate.
While these three scenarios are distinct, the role friends of Sri Lanka, in the region and outside, can play in helping to move the country towards the more hopeful scenarios, and away from the fearful ones, is the same.
The Sri Lankan government as a responsible state in the international system has some basic obligations even while fighting an insurgency. These include upholding the human rights of all its citizens, irrespective of their ethnic affiliation; respecting the laws of war; providing humanitarian assistance to those affected by the conflict, including refugees; and ensuring access to humanitarian organisations, local and international, seeking to assist those affected by the armed violence. Sri Lanka’s friends can help it fulfil these responsibilities.
At the same time, the world can also impress upon the Tamil Tigers that while they are no state, they must still respect the laws of war as an armed group engaged in a conflict. These include, but are not limited to, refraining from deliberately targetig civilians, ensuring humanitarian access to those affected by war, and refraining from recruiting children. They must emphasise that the future role of the Tamil Tigers as serious political interlocutors in a peace settlement will depend on how they conduct themselves during war.
Sri Lanka’s friends can also prod the two parties to lay out their respective visions of a political settlement without evading it. These must not be the reiteration of tired old positions by both sides – where the LTTE repeats its call for an interim administration that only it controls, and the Sri Lankan government reiterates its commitment to a unitary state that only it controls.
Rather it must be an imaginative effort to describe both an end goal – where they would like to see the country end up - and a pathway for getting there – how they would like to set about achieving it. This will invariably involve a permanent political settlement, an interim structure for getting there, a process for disarmament on the part of the LTTE and demilitarisation on the part of the state, and finally, a mechanism for post-war reconstruction that can rebuild the shattered lives of all communities.
Finally, the world can also help amplify Sri Lankan voices that support a solution that respects the concerns of all communities equally within an undivided country. These include the Muslims, the upcountry Tamils, and the left-liberal political actors, whose significant presence has been ignored, precisely because they have not been obstacles to peace.
While none of these steps are easy, they are also not impossible. But the window of opportunity for initiating them will be very brief, immediately after the next round of fighting ends, and just before both parties forget about the bloody futility of war.
While the belligerents make war, those who are seeking peace in Sri Lanka from within and those who wish to help from without must begin their plans for making peace. The people of Sri Lanka deserve another chance.
(Ram Manikkalingam is a Visiting Professor of Political Science at the University of Amsterdam. He served as Senior Advisor in the peace process to President Kumaratunga)
[www.dailymirror.lk]
Sri Lanka’s phoney peace is over. By abrogating the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, the Sri Lankan government has finally proclaimed what has been a reality for two years – the effective end of the ceasefire brokered by the Norwegians six years ago.
The Sinhala-dominated government and the Tamil Tigers have decided that war is not only inevitable but also required, before any fresh political process can emerge. President Mahinda Rajapaksa has promised to eradicate terrorism. His brother, Defence Secretary Gothabaya Rajapakse has promised to kill Velupillai Prabakaran, the leader of the Tamil Tigers. Scenting victory, the Sri Lankan military is pressing in on the Tiger heartland of the north on several fronts, while targeting Tiger leaders for assassination.
Meanwhile, the LTTE leader has proclaimed that only military force will work to change the government’s policy. He has directed attacks against hard military targets such as Air Force bases and soft political targets like ministers and civil guardsmen. The Tamil Tigers are using a combination of hit and run attacks, bombings and assassinations to deter and delay the government’s impending assault.
The Sri Lankan government has newly acquired armaments – multi-barrel rocket launchers, heavier artillery, precision guided missiles, and bunker busters – and has recruited 30,000 new recruits into its armed forces. The Tamil Tigers have developed an air wing, an effective sea wing, and have heavily infiltrated population centres in the Sinhala-dominated South. This next round of violence will lead to the deaths of thousands, the displacement of hundreds of thousands, and the destruction of property on a larger scale than what we have ever witnessed before in Sri Lanka.
The LTTE can emerge defeated, weakened, or emboldened from this fighting. The Tigers will be defeated if the government succeeds in ejecting them from territory they control and in eliminating their leadership. They will be weakened if the government ejects the Tigers from territory they control but they can still continue as an insurgent organisation capable of guerrilla operations and terrorist attacks. The LTTE will be emboldened, of course, if it succeeds in bringing the government offensive to a standstill. While these three scenarios are very different, the role that friends of Sri Lanka, in the region and outside, can play in helping to move the country towards a stable peace is the same in all of them.
The first scenario is the government deals a decisive blow to LTTE – ejecting it from territory it controls and eliminating its leadership. The hope, in this scenario, is that a Sri Lanka liberated from war will find the will to seek peace. Sinhala hardliners fearful of Tamil autonomy in LTTE hands will be less opposed to granting it after a Tiger defeat. Tamil hardliners seeking a separate state will stop doing so. This will create the opportunity for a new politics of co-existence among all communities on the island. But the fear is that military victory may instead embolden Sinhala hardliners to reject any concession to the minorities – Tamil and Muslim – compelling them to live at the sufferance of the majority. War will give way, not to peace and reconciliation, but to bitterness and recrimination. Sri Lanka may not have war but neither will it have a just peace.
The second scenario points to a weakened, though not defeated, LTTE. It is ejected from territory it controls, but continues as a formidable insurgent organisation capable of guerrilla operations and terrorist attacks. The hope here is that both parties will declare victory and call a truce. The government will view further efforts at defeating the LTTE as too costly, and the Tigers will accept that they cannot get what they want by military means alone. Each will give up on its preferred political objective. The government will give up on centralising all power in Colombo and the LTTE will give up on the establishment of a separate state. The result will be the classic federal compromise that most people see as the only reasonable solution. The fear is that neither party will have the political sagacity to stop at a partial victory or defeat. Rather the Sri Lankan government will press on in the hope of eliminating the LTTE permanently. And the Tamil Tigers will refuse to accept a new balance of power where they do not control territory and administer populations. Each side will seek to continue the war. Neither will prevail.
The final scenario is a bloody stalemate – where the government fails to eject the LTTE and the Tamil Tigers fail to make military headway themselves. The government will unleash all it has, but will not dislodge the LTTE from territory it controls. The Tamil Tigers will hold firm but they will not be able to expand their hold on territory or population. The result will be a stalemate, but after spilling a lot of blood. The hope is that after much cost to the people of the country the government and the Tamil Tigers will have relearned the lesson that war alone will not alter the political dynamic of the country. They will initiate a political process that will keep the strengths and redress the weaknesses of the previous one. This process, with a combination of internal acceptance and external support, will get somewhere. The fear in this scenario is that a combination of Sinhala extremism and political rivalry in the South and Tamil extremism and militarism in the North will prevent the parties from seizing the opportunity to move forward toward a fresh process. Instead, they will continue seeking military breakthroughs only to be further mired in a bloodier stalemate.
While these three scenarios are distinct, the role friends of Sri Lanka, in the region and outside, can play in helping to move the country towards the more hopeful scenarios, and away from the fearful ones, is the same.
The Sri Lankan government as a responsible state in the international system has some basic obligations even while fighting an insurgency. These include upholding the human rights of all its citizens, irrespective of their ethnic affiliation; respecting the laws of war; providing humanitarian assistance to those affected by the conflict, including refugees; and ensuring access to humanitarian organisations, local and international, seeking to assist those affected by the armed violence. Sri Lanka’s friends can help it fulfil these responsibilities.
At the same time, the world can also impress upon the Tamil Tigers that while they are no state, they must still respect the laws of war as an armed group engaged in a conflict. These include, but are not limited to, refraining from deliberately targetig civilians, ensuring humanitarian access to those affected by war, and refraining from recruiting children. They must emphasise that the future role of the Tamil Tigers as serious political interlocutors in a peace settlement will depend on how they conduct themselves during war.
Sri Lanka’s friends can also prod the two parties to lay out their respective visions of a political settlement without evading it. These must not be the reiteration of tired old positions by both sides – where the LTTE repeats its call for an interim administration that only it controls, and the Sri Lankan government reiterates its commitment to a unitary state that only it controls.
Rather it must be an imaginative effort to describe both an end goal – where they would like to see the country end up - and a pathway for getting there – how they would like to set about achieving it. This will invariably involve a permanent political settlement, an interim structure for getting there, a process for disarmament on the part of the LTTE and demilitarisation on the part of the state, and finally, a mechanism for post-war reconstruction that can rebuild the shattered lives of all communities.
Finally, the world can also help amplify Sri Lankan voices that support a solution that respects the concerns of all communities equally within an undivided country. These include the Muslims, the upcountry Tamils, and the left-liberal political actors, whose significant presence has been ignored, precisely because they have not been obstacles to peace.
While none of these steps are easy, they are also not impossible. But the window of opportunity for initiating them will be very brief, immediately after the next round of fighting ends, and just before both parties forget about the bloody futility of war.
While the belligerents make war, those who are seeking peace in Sri Lanka from within and those who wish to help from without must begin their plans for making peace. The people of Sri Lanka deserve another chance.
(Ram Manikkalingam is a Visiting Professor of Political Science at the University of Amsterdam. He served as Senior Advisor in the peace process to President Kumaratunga)
[www.dailymirror.lk]
UNESCO ADMITS - NO MEDIA DEATHS IN SRI LANKA IN 2007
THIS IS WHAT WE'VE BEEN TELLING THE WORLD -
TAMIL TIGER TERROR PROPAGANDISTS ARE NOT MEDIA
Paris, 01 April, (Asiantribune.com): UNESCO has accepted that not a single journalist had been killed in Sri Lanka in 2007. UNESCO Director General Koichiro Matsuura’s report for 2007 listed names of 53 journalists killed in number countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia DPR Congo, Palestine and Myanmar.
There had been no killings of journalist in Sri Lanka, India, Philippines, Russia, Colombia, Ecuador, Lebanon and Pakistan, where there had been killings of journalists in the previous year. The Director General of UNESCO stated this in his report submitted to the Intergovernmental Committee of the International Programme for Development of Communications held at UNESCO Headquarters in Paris from March 26 to 28. Sugeeswara Senadhira, Minister Counsellor of the Sri Lanka Embassy in Paris represented Sri Lanka at this meeting.
Analysts pointed out that UNESCO Director General’s report is an admittance that the Voice of Tigers, the broadcasting arm of the LTTE could not be considered as a civil media institution. In November 2007, three LTTE cadres working at the Voice of Tigers died when the clandestine broadcasting station was attacked by Sri Lanka Air Force. In December 2007, Koichiro Matsuura, Director General of UNESCO has issued a statement on the incident and the Government of Sri Lanka pointed out that UNESCO had no mandate to issue a statement on the aerial attack on a terrorist broadcasting station.The Intergovernmental Council of IPDC unanimously denounced attacks targeting journalists and urged Member States to comply with relevant obligations under international law to end impunity for such crimes.
More on this on Asian Tribune ...http://www.asiantribune.com/?q=node/10309
TAMIL TIGER TERROR PROPAGANDISTS ARE NOT MEDIA
Paris, 01 April, (Asiantribune.com): UNESCO has accepted that not a single journalist had been killed in Sri Lanka in 2007. UNESCO Director General Koichiro Matsuura’s report for 2007 listed names of 53 journalists killed in number countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia DPR Congo, Palestine and Myanmar.
There had been no killings of journalist in Sri Lanka, India, Philippines, Russia, Colombia, Ecuador, Lebanon and Pakistan, where there had been killings of journalists in the previous year. The Director General of UNESCO stated this in his report submitted to the Intergovernmental Committee of the International Programme for Development of Communications held at UNESCO Headquarters in Paris from March 26 to 28. Sugeeswara Senadhira, Minister Counsellor of the Sri Lanka Embassy in Paris represented Sri Lanka at this meeting.
Analysts pointed out that UNESCO Director General’s report is an admittance that the Voice of Tigers, the broadcasting arm of the LTTE could not be considered as a civil media institution. In November 2007, three LTTE cadres working at the Voice of Tigers died when the clandestine broadcasting station was attacked by Sri Lanka Air Force. In December 2007, Koichiro Matsuura, Director General of UNESCO has issued a statement on the incident and the Government of Sri Lanka pointed out that UNESCO had no mandate to issue a statement on the aerial attack on a terrorist broadcasting station.The Intergovernmental Council of IPDC unanimously denounced attacks targeting journalists and urged Member States to comply with relevant obligations under international law to end impunity for such crimes.
More on this on Asian Tribune ...http://www.asiantribune.com/?q=node/10309
Thursday, March 27, 2008
CHANGES IN THE EAST AND THE STF
RECENT changes in the eastern theatre, including the transfer of Nimal Lewke, the Commandant of the STF seems to have stirred up a political storm.
While the transfers and on-going changes which include inducting some STF personnel into different areas such as Amparai District and filling the vaccuum created by their moving out in Batticaloa with regular army troops is a part of military necessity, withered political whiners of the UNP seem to be attempting to create a cosnpiracy out of the situation for obvious reasons. These goons seem to have fallen under the LTTE's spell to such an extent that they appear to think that their lies and concocted stories can be spewed out without any consequences.
What they don't seem to realize is that the possible consequence is of the greatest importance; the people of Sri Lanka continue to lose faith and hope by starting to realize that the UNP has become a mouth piece and proxy for the terrorist LTTE.
While the transfers and on-going changes which include inducting some STF personnel into different areas such as Amparai District and filling the vaccuum created by their moving out in Batticaloa with regular army troops is a part of military necessity, withered political whiners of the UNP seem to be attempting to create a cosnpiracy out of the situation for obvious reasons. These goons seem to have fallen under the LTTE's spell to such an extent that they appear to think that their lies and concocted stories can be spewed out without any consequences.
What they don't seem to realize is that the possible consequence is of the greatest importance; the people of Sri Lanka continue to lose faith and hope by starting to realize that the UNP has become a mouth piece and proxy for the terrorist LTTE.
Wednesday, March 26, 2008
APPROX. 300 LTTE FRONT ORGANIZATIONS IN EU TO BE BANNED
VISITING EU representatives have informed the SL govt that arrangements are being made to ban over 300 LTTE front organizations that have been set up to fund terrorist operations in Sri Lanka.
More information is awaited on those developments.
More information is awaited on those developments.
Monday, March 24, 2008
LTTE hoist by its own petard
Fade-in 1983.
As a college student in Chennai, the sudden influx of Lankan Tamils into the college was not really commented upon -- after all, they look the same, dress the same, even if their Tamil is a little singsong -- till the pogrom by the Lankan army hit the headlines. Those were the days, my friend, when Tamil Nadu rose as one man. In the vanguard of any such uprising, peaceful or otherwise, has to be the student ranks, and we did our mite. Took out rallies, held black-badge demonstrations, shouted slogans till our throats ran dry. Our hearts, as was the entire state's, was with the people of Yazhpaanam, called rather oddly Jaffna in English. If Eelam became our Palestine, Jaffna was our Wailing Wall.
Tamil pride, which does not need any kindling to flare up and which is a combustible product, was burning bright. The refugees who fled the atrocities back home were feted as they landed in Rameswaram. Tamil Nadu was the land of their ancestors, which they had left behind, and this was homecoming for at least a part of the Tamil diaspora.
The not-too-wealthy state opened its heart and treasury for its compatriots. Given the strength of Tamil sentiment, the Centre could not but step in, furtively at first through training camps for wannabe soldiers and more actively later. It is a different matter that these men and women, boys and girls, were to give the very same Indian Army that trained them a bloody nose later, but the consequences of living by the sword were not realised by a prime minister who specialised in living on the razor's edge. She had, of course, become a veteran at playing with fire, be it in Punjab or in Eelam. The former claimed her, and the latter her only surviving son.
Fade-out 1983. Fade-in 2000.
Eelam is once again in the air, and Jaffna the epicentre. Gone, however, is the public empathy. Tamils are still fighting Sinhalese, and blood is still being spilled in the jungles of Venni and elsewhere in Sri Lanka. Fifteen years is all it has taken for Tamil Nadu to realise that a neighbour's war cannot become one's own. Late realisation, Sonia Gandhi would be justified in saying, but then Tamils are not known for thinking with their heads when it comes to things Tamil.
In the meantime, plenty of water has flowed into the Palk Straits. A domineering prime minister seeking a global role dabbled in waters too deep for a political novice and paid the price with his life. The southern state, once a haven of peace, fell victim to the gun culture as those who came as refugees and state guests abused their hospitality and carried their internecine warfare into Tamil Nadu. May 1991 changed all that.
One politician was against all that happened. You may revile her as corrupt, you can accuse her of having misused her official position, the courts in fact will rule on her having amassed wealth as chief minister. But Jayalalitha had the guts, and foresight, to oppose the Tamil Tigers at a time when they were seen as the saviours of Tamil culture and pride. May 1991 proved to the people of Tamil Nadu how right she was, and how wrong they were. Which explains how indifferent Tamil Nadu was to the fall of Jaffna in 1995. And hardly ebullient about the Tigers' chances of reclaiming the city now.
The political establishment has seen the writing on the wall. Thus we have M Karunanidhi backing the Indian government's attempts not to meddle in troubled waters. And even V Gopalaswamy, whose heart bleeds for the LTTE, is surprisingly moderate.
For the Indian government, notably its head the prime minister, the temptation to interfere in what is strictly not your business must be overpowering. This is the same urge that brought the invincible Americans to their knees in the jungles of Vietnam; the same impulse that made Rajiv Gandhi sacrifice Indian lives in Jaffna. But Vajpayee, a seasoned politician who has had the privilege of watching any number of prime ministers bungle and stumble from his vantage point on the Opposition benches, will not play ball. Expatriate Tamils may still be aroused by what is happening in north-eastern Sri Lanka, but for the large numbers scattered in India, it is life as usual.
I daresay that part of this emotional turning away from Eelam has to do with the degeneration in Tamil Nadu during the heyday of the war for Jaffna. The other reason could be the deteriorating situation in our own backyard, Kashmir. The insurgency there, to recall, flared up from a subterranean feeling of resentment into open warfare against the Indian State in 1989, much after Eelam dominated Tamil psyche.
The feeling was one of déjà vu. Training camps in Pakistan? But that's exactly what we were doing for the LTTE. Pakistan's support for the Kashmiri terrorists who we simply call militants? Again, how dissimilar is that to what India was doing, extending moral and financial support to the Tigers in their war against the Sri Lankan State?
How come Indian real estate was so precious while we were willing to abet the dismemberment of a neighbouring, not-too-unfriendly state? These were questions that lay dormant for a long time, till May 1991, when we saw a former prime minister being blown to smithereens by a human bomb. Blown to smithereens in a manner made so familiar in our neighbourhood by the very men whom our own army trained to become killing machines. If the images from Sriperumbudur were hard to digest, it was harder for native Tamils to digest that the movement they backed with their hearts would ultimately turn on their own.
Nine years after Rajiv Gandhi's assassination, it is perhaps time to acknowledge that in his death, he redeemed himself. That with his life, he gave back Tamilians their sense of perspective.
Saisuresh Sivaswamy
As a college student in Chennai, the sudden influx of Lankan Tamils into the college was not really commented upon -- after all, they look the same, dress the same, even if their Tamil is a little singsong -- till the pogrom by the Lankan army hit the headlines. Those were the days, my friend, when Tamil Nadu rose as one man. In the vanguard of any such uprising, peaceful or otherwise, has to be the student ranks, and we did our mite. Took out rallies, held black-badge demonstrations, shouted slogans till our throats ran dry. Our hearts, as was the entire state's, was with the people of Yazhpaanam, called rather oddly Jaffna in English. If Eelam became our Palestine, Jaffna was our Wailing Wall.
Tamil pride, which does not need any kindling to flare up and which is a combustible product, was burning bright. The refugees who fled the atrocities back home were feted as they landed in Rameswaram. Tamil Nadu was the land of their ancestors, which they had left behind, and this was homecoming for at least a part of the Tamil diaspora.
The not-too-wealthy state opened its heart and treasury for its compatriots. Given the strength of Tamil sentiment, the Centre could not but step in, furtively at first through training camps for wannabe soldiers and more actively later. It is a different matter that these men and women, boys and girls, were to give the very same Indian Army that trained them a bloody nose later, but the consequences of living by the sword were not realised by a prime minister who specialised in living on the razor's edge. She had, of course, become a veteran at playing with fire, be it in Punjab or in Eelam. The former claimed her, and the latter her only surviving son.
Fade-out 1983. Fade-in 2000.
Eelam is once again in the air, and Jaffna the epicentre. Gone, however, is the public empathy. Tamils are still fighting Sinhalese, and blood is still being spilled in the jungles of Venni and elsewhere in Sri Lanka. Fifteen years is all it has taken for Tamil Nadu to realise that a neighbour's war cannot become one's own. Late realisation, Sonia Gandhi would be justified in saying, but then Tamils are not known for thinking with their heads when it comes to things Tamil.
In the meantime, plenty of water has flowed into the Palk Straits. A domineering prime minister seeking a global role dabbled in waters too deep for a political novice and paid the price with his life. The southern state, once a haven of peace, fell victim to the gun culture as those who came as refugees and state guests abused their hospitality and carried their internecine warfare into Tamil Nadu. May 1991 changed all that.
One politician was against all that happened. You may revile her as corrupt, you can accuse her of having misused her official position, the courts in fact will rule on her having amassed wealth as chief minister. But Jayalalitha had the guts, and foresight, to oppose the Tamil Tigers at a time when they were seen as the saviours of Tamil culture and pride. May 1991 proved to the people of Tamil Nadu how right she was, and how wrong they were. Which explains how indifferent Tamil Nadu was to the fall of Jaffna in 1995. And hardly ebullient about the Tigers' chances of reclaiming the city now.
The political establishment has seen the writing on the wall. Thus we have M Karunanidhi backing the Indian government's attempts not to meddle in troubled waters. And even V Gopalaswamy, whose heart bleeds for the LTTE, is surprisingly moderate.
For the Indian government, notably its head the prime minister, the temptation to interfere in what is strictly not your business must be overpowering. This is the same urge that brought the invincible Americans to their knees in the jungles of Vietnam; the same impulse that made Rajiv Gandhi sacrifice Indian lives in Jaffna. But Vajpayee, a seasoned politician who has had the privilege of watching any number of prime ministers bungle and stumble from his vantage point on the Opposition benches, will not play ball. Expatriate Tamils may still be aroused by what is happening in north-eastern Sri Lanka, but for the large numbers scattered in India, it is life as usual.
I daresay that part of this emotional turning away from Eelam has to do with the degeneration in Tamil Nadu during the heyday of the war for Jaffna. The other reason could be the deteriorating situation in our own backyard, Kashmir. The insurgency there, to recall, flared up from a subterranean feeling of resentment into open warfare against the Indian State in 1989, much after Eelam dominated Tamil psyche.
The feeling was one of déjà vu. Training camps in Pakistan? But that's exactly what we were doing for the LTTE. Pakistan's support for the Kashmiri terrorists who we simply call militants? Again, how dissimilar is that to what India was doing, extending moral and financial support to the Tigers in their war against the Sri Lankan State?
How come Indian real estate was so precious while we were willing to abet the dismemberment of a neighbouring, not-too-unfriendly state? These were questions that lay dormant for a long time, till May 1991, when we saw a former prime minister being blown to smithereens by a human bomb. Blown to smithereens in a manner made so familiar in our neighbourhood by the very men whom our own army trained to become killing machines. If the images from Sriperumbudur were hard to digest, it was harder for native Tamils to digest that the movement they backed with their hearts would ultimately turn on their own.
Nine years after Rajiv Gandhi's assassination, it is perhaps time to acknowledge that in his death, he redeemed himself. That with his life, he gave back Tamilians their sense of perspective.
Saisuresh Sivaswamy
HELLO ELEPHANT PASS...
NEWS from various sources seem to indicate that the SLA is determined to try out its new mechanized brigade and a brand new set of tactics in a frontal assault on Elephant Pass.
While the rhetoric from some of the SLA's top rankers reminds one of a certain western leader who talked of 'shock and awe' in a war that has now mired his soldiers in a hell with no end in sight, there are other veteran soldiers who think an attack on E'Pass is not really all that important to the anti-LTTE drive at this point. But the planners have done a great job so far in conducting the present anti-terrorism efforts effectively and with specific, meaningful goals achieved. Losing E'pass would deny the LTTE the ability to choke off an armed assault on the rest of the areas from the northern side.
Here's a great article on the subject...http://sf-3.blogspot.com/2008/02/should-sla-make-move-on-eps.html
While the rhetoric from some of the SLA's top rankers reminds one of a certain western leader who talked of 'shock and awe' in a war that has now mired his soldiers in a hell with no end in sight, there are other veteran soldiers who think an attack on E'Pass is not really all that important to the anti-LTTE drive at this point. But the planners have done a great job so far in conducting the present anti-terrorism efforts effectively and with specific, meaningful goals achieved. Losing E'pass would deny the LTTE the ability to choke off an armed assault on the rest of the areas from the northern side.
Here's a great article on the subject...http://sf-3.blogspot.com/2008/02/should-sla-make-move-on-eps.html
Tuesday, March 18, 2008
TAMILS ARE SLAVES IN INDIA - SAYS THE LTTE
IN an increasingly shrill series of attacks against the largest democracy in the world, the Tamil Tigers of .forced child-soldiering fame now accuse India of enslaving its over 60million Tamils.
The LTTE, as the vicious tamil tiger movement is known, is also currently involved in covertly supporting various terror initiatives in other parts of the world, providing logistical and training support to Al Quieda terrorists and other terror groups across the world.
"...Colombo, March 18 (IANS) A leader of the Tamil Tigers has alleged that Tamils in India are not a free people but are slaves of the Indian state, according to a media report Tuesday.
'In ancient times the whole of India was a Tamil land. And the Chola kings (from Tamil Nadu) ruled over Sri Lanka for 70 years. Today, the Tamils are slaves in India and are fighting for their liberation in Sri Lanka,' Tamil daily 'Sudar Oli' quoted Thamilendhi as saying...."
[http://in.news.yahoo.com/indiaabroad/20080318/r_t_ians_wl_asia/twl-tamils-are-slaves-in-india-ltte-lead-d5d6288.html]
Tamils of Sri Lanka have been enjoying universal adult franchise along with their majority counter-parts, unlike whom they've failed to produce moderate leaders who could relate to all communities. The Tamils of Sri Lanka have only been enslaved by the violence of the LTTE, and not by anything else. Hence it would make sense for the Tamil Tigers to liberate the Tamils of India now.
The LTTE, as the vicious tamil tiger movement is known, is also currently involved in covertly supporting various terror initiatives in other parts of the world, providing logistical and training support to Al Quieda terrorists and other terror groups across the world.
"...Colombo, March 18 (IANS) A leader of the Tamil Tigers has alleged that Tamils in India are not a free people but are slaves of the Indian state, according to a media report Tuesday.
'In ancient times the whole of India was a Tamil land. And the Chola kings (from Tamil Nadu) ruled over Sri Lanka for 70 years. Today, the Tamils are slaves in India and are fighting for their liberation in Sri Lanka,' Tamil daily 'Sudar Oli' quoted Thamilendhi as saying...."
[http://in.news.yahoo.com/indiaabroad/20080318/r_t_ians_wl_asia/twl-tamils-are-slaves-in-india-ltte-lead-d5d6288.html]
Tamils of Sri Lanka have been enjoying universal adult franchise along with their majority counter-parts, unlike whom they've failed to produce moderate leaders who could relate to all communities. The Tamils of Sri Lanka have only been enslaved by the violence of the LTTE, and not by anything else. Hence it would make sense for the Tamil Tigers to liberate the Tamils of India now.
Friday, March 14, 2008
Sri Lanka's Tigers in crisis
In the past few weeks there have been many media reports that point to the prevalence of confusion and disarray among the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the face of heavy losses inflicted by the armed forces of the government of Sri Lanka.
Apart from many references to the injury sustained by the LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran in the course of an aerial bombardment in November 2007, there was some speculation that he may even have died. (Claims of Prabhakaran's death may be set to rest after Prabhakaran's "public appearance" at the funeral of the pro-LTTE Tamil National Alliance member of parliament, P Sivanesan, in the rebel-held Wanni area, of which the LTTE released photographs on March 9.
The details that embellish these reports, though ignored by spokesmen for the LTTE, have been refuted with disdain by several pro-LTTE writers. Given the questionable credibility of "news" originating from either side of the great divide, it has seldom been possible to sort out the truth from fiction in the stories on the Sri Lankan conflict.
What can, consequently, be attempted is to contextualize the recent surge of media attention on turbulence in the shrinking Tiger habitat of the "Vanni" in northern Sri Lanka, without speculating on whether its leader is dead or dying or hibernating prior to a deadly leap at the jugular. Then, the information must be synthesized into the situation that prevails at present, and taken from sources uncontaminated by propaganda.
In the checkered history of the LTTE, spanning the past three decades during which Prabhakaran has held sway as its supreme leader, there have been several spells during which its insurrectionary capacity suffered serious setbacks.
Prominent among such recessions were: the brief eclipse of the LTTE in the aftermath of the Indian peacekeeping intervention in 1987; the worldwide anti-Tiger sentiment evoked by the assassination of former Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991; the strategic losses stemming from its expulsion by the Sri Lankan armed forces from the Jaffna peninsula in 1995; the constraining effects on its international operations generated by the global tide of hostility towards terrorism following the al-Qaeda attack on the United States in 2001; and, more far-reaching in impact than any other, the internal revolt led by "Colonel Karuna" in March 2004.
The impression conveyed by the experiences in each of these episodes, however, is that the LTTE possessed the inner resilience and the external support required for recovery, if not entirely unscathed, at least with sufficient strength to persist with its campaign of warfare and terror. By contrast, the losses suffered in the more recent past appear to constitute an irreversible and aggravating trend featured by indications that could well portend a final collapse.
Despite the weakening of its grip on the eastern lowlands that resulted from the calamitous breakaway of the Karuna group, the LTTE leadership persisted with unswerving commitment to its goal of establishing a sovereign Tamil nation-state - Eelam - encompassing the entire northeast of Sri Lanka, the pledges of the ceasefire agreement of February 2000 notwithstanding.
As in earlier times, its efforts were directed mainly at enhancement of military strength, expanding the territory under its control in the Northern and Eastern provinces and eliminating its rivals in that part of the country, mobilizing international support for its cause, and destabilizing the government of Sri Lanka through carefully regulated intimidation and terror. Instigating a Sinhalese backlash of violence against the Tamils living outside the northeast - a re-enactment of 1983 - also remained a prime objective as was underscored by the assassination of Sri Lanka's charismatic foreign minister, Lakshman Kadirgamar, a provocative outrage committed in the final days of Chandrika Kumaratunga's presidential tenure.
Colombo-based politics of the country during this period remained in a state of flux, featured by both frequent changes of the power configuration as well as intense electoral rivalry. Given the fact that the release of the foreign aid pledged by the donors remained conditional on progress being made towards a negotiated settlement of the conflict, government policy had to accommodate two mutually conflicting needs - that of strengthening security and defense in the face of the mounting Tiger threat, and persistence with credible peace overtures to the LTTE. The latter encountered the almost insurmountable problem of fierce inter-party dissension on what could be offered to the Tigers without endangering the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka.
On the eve of the presidential election of November 2005, Prabhakaran enforced a boycott of the polls in the north and parts of the eastern lowlands where Ranil Wickremasinghe, former prime minister and a frontrunner of the presidential stakes, would have attracted substantially more support than his rival, Mahinda Rajapakse. This decision appears, in retrospect, to have been a monumental blunder that marks the onset of a drastic change in the fortunes of Prabhakaran's Eelam campaign. The boycott decision was evidently based on the premise that Wickremasinghe, hailed internationally as the "peace candidate", would, with his commitment to power-sharing under a federal system of government, place in serious jeopardy the case for a secessionist campaign.
Prabhakaran's expectation was that Rajapakse, backed as he was by electoral allies vehemently opposed to a political compromise involving devolution of power to the northeast, would actually attempt to implement his campaign pledges to jettison the ceasefire agreement, to evict the "White Tigers" (Norwegians) from their role as facilitators of peace negotiations, and to discard the notion of the LTTE being the sole representative of the Tamils. Such a hawkish approach, the LTTE leadership believed, would pave the way for a resumption of military confrontations in earnest, backed by vastly enhanced international sympathy and support for the rebels' cause.
Having contributed to Rajapakse's victory at the election, the LTTE leaders began to test the resolve of the new president. Thus, while articulating with greater vehemence than ever before their earlier demands for government intervention in disarming the Karuna group, and for constitutional power over the northeast pending a final resolution of the conflict, they launched a series of guerrilla attacks and acts of terrorism which, in April 2006, reached the heart of Colombo's defense establishment in the near-successful attempt to assassinate the Commander of the Sri Lanka Army, Lieutenant General Sarath Fonseka.
The sharply escalating level of violence did not evoke a retaliatory response from the government, at least for some time. Rajapakse persisted with his pursuit of peace, risking, in the process, the support of some of his parliamentary allies. He established an "All-Party Representative Committee" tasked with formulating constitutional reforms based on the axiom of devolution. He backed the Norwegian efforts at facilitating fresh peace negotiations, expressing a solemn hope that the brief meeting between delegates of the government and the LTTE, staged at Geneva in February 2006, would mark the resumption of a continuing dialogue with the Tiger leadership.
Rajapakse was also reported to have made a "secret" attempt to establish direct contact with the LTTE high command, knowing full well that the attempt would not be concealed from Sri Lanka's friends abroad. The intensifying LTTE violence, however, could not be ignored indefinitely.
From the commencement of Rajapakse's presidency up to the bomb attack on the army commander (approximately 150 days later), 150 armed services personnel, in addition to about 150 civilians, had been killed by the LTTE. The animosity between the LTTE and the security forces had reached such a fever pitch, and the nationalists' pressure for some retaliation had become so intense, that the president was eventually compelled to initiate a series of air strikes on identified LTTE bases.
Nevertheless, as the president had surmised, the continuing belligerence of the LTTE, on the one hand, and the show of restraint by the government, on the other, did resonate in the policy stances, vis-a-vis Sri Lanka, of several Western governments, both in a substantially enhanced flow of aid as well as in the imposition of sanctions on the LTTE, in member-states of the EU and in Canada in May-June 2006.
The repercussions of Prabhakaran's capricious gamble at the presidential polls soon instilled into his strategy a sense of desperation. This found expression in a series of "Sea Tiger" attacks (including an act of piracy) that evoked strictures from several quarters including the secretary general of the UN and the head of the Scandinavian "Ceasefire Monitoring Mission" stationed in Sri Lanka
Prabhakaran retaliated by demanding the removal of all non-Norwegian members of the Monitoring Mission from the northeast. The tempo of violence was increased further with a spate of attacks on military and civilian targets in all parts of the country. Then came the major military showdown in the eastern lowlands that began on July 20, 2006, in the form of a "riparian" confrontation in the irrigation channel system of Mavil Aru (south of Trincomalee) which compelled the government to retaliate in earnest, with a nod of approval from the US. Thereafter, following a series of bloody battles that lasted up until mid-2007 - in the course of which the LTTE incurred heavy losses - the rebels were finally evicted from the entire Eastern Province.
Throughout this period of intense military activity in the east, confrontations between the security forces and the LTTE elsewhere in the country took various forms. The Forward Defense Lines (FDL) of the government-controlled areas in the Jaffna peninsula and in the hinterland of Mannar continued to be venues of low intensity clashes, with occasional flare-ups.
In localities adjacent to the FDL in Vavuniya District, army killings of suspected insurgents and LTTE claymore-mine attacks and ambushes of army patrols occurred in routine fashion. The severe maritime losses suffered by the LTTE during these months included the sinking of 11 of its vessels off the east coast. Most significant, as an ingredient of the LTTE military debacle, was the destruction caused by the constant aerial bombardments in which Thamilchelvan, head of the LTTE's political wing, perished on November 3, 2007, and Prabhakaran suffered injury on November 27, 2007.
These military defeats constitute only one (albeit the key) component of the current LTTE crisis. The mutually interacting "external" misfortunes of the Tigers in the recent past include the death in December 2006 of Anton Balasingham, who had served for well over two decades as by far the most effective international spokesman and propagandist for the secessionist campaign.
The impact of the loss of its carefully nurtured image of invincibility has been even more profound, especially on the support from the expatriate Sri Lankan Tamil communities whose responses to fluctuating fortunes of the LTTE have never been devoid of elements typical of "cheer-squad" reactions.
Recent reports also indicate that the increasingly stringent enforcement of anti-terrorism regulations in some Western countries has curtailed both diaspora funding as well as other operations of LTTE agents and "front" outfits abroad. The crescendo of their desperate campaign for UN "humanitarian intervention" against the alleged proliferation of human rights violations in Sri Lanka has achieved a measure of success in generating external pressures against the country's war effort, but has had no mitigating effect on the pariah status of the Tigers.
Foremost among the internal causes for the present LTTE crisis is the prevailing trend towards factional disintegration of its leadership which, as the related evidence suggests, could well represent the emergence subterranean rivalries that had been in existence all along.
It may be recalled that the departure of Karuna caused a mini-purge in the Tiger leadership. Thereafter, when Thamilchelvan was killed in November 2007, certain critics (among them, S R Balasubramaniam, Congress Party leader in the Indian State of Tamil Nadu), cast doubt on the "official" explanation of the death, and pointed to the possibility of Thamilchelvan having been killed by Prabhakaran in the same way he had liquidated other potential rivals in the past.
In addition, throughout recent years, there has been the barely concealed animosity between two of the highest-ranking Tiger leaders - "Pottu Amman" (aka Shanmuganathan Sivasankaran, the feared head of the Tiger intelligence network whose spectacular "hits" include the masterminding of the Rajiv Gandhi assassination) and "Soosai" (aka Thillaiyampalan Sivanesan), the charismatic "Sea Tiger" admiral.
According to an analysis of this rivalry by the journalist D B S Jeyaraj, when Soosai (who had been accused by Pottu Amman of connivance with the renegade Karuna and the Indian external intelligence agency, Research and Analysis Wing - RAW)suffered serious injury in 2004 while engaged in a speed-boat maneuver (though the injury was officially attributed to an accident) the widespread and lingering belief within the LTTE that it was the consequence of an attempt by Pottu to murder Soosai had given rise to clashes among its rank and file which took a long time to subside.
Factional rivalries of this type in the Vanni and their repercussions outside the country are likely to intensify if, indeed, the reported weakening of Prabhakaran's grip over the LTTE is true.
Yet another internal dimension of the crisis is seen in the recent resurgence of several anti-LTTE political organizations among the Tamil community of Sri Lanka, most of which were reconciled to a shadowy existence in the heyday of the Tigers in the past.
Tamil critics of the LTTE have become bolder in expressing their views than ever before. Some among them repeatedly announced that the "Eelam" campaign is doomed. A distinction between the LTTE interests and those of the Tamils of Sri Lanka is being drawn with clarity and vehemence. There is also a publicly expressed suspicion that the recent spate of murders of several pro-LTTE activists operating outside the northeast represents the work of such organizations, the members of which rank among the innumerable victims of LTTE terror.
As a barrier to statutory recognition of the entire northeast as a ethnically distinctive entity (which, of course, constitutes the conceptual basis of the secessionist campaign), the Supreme Court announced on October 16, 2006, that the then-existing amalgamation of the Northern and Eastern provinces as a single unit of Provincial Government (a sequel to the Indo-Lanka Accord of 1987) had all along been constitutionally ultra vires. This is an even more insurmountable measure than the military eviction of the LTTE from the east.
The cumulative impact of these complex military and political defeats on the LTTE has been devastating, producing the most acute crisis of the group's existence. Sustained government operations in the north now have the capacity to inflict progressive damage on the rebel infrastructure and support base, increasingly undermining any residual potential for recovery and consolidation.
G H Peiris, professor emeritus of the University of Peradeniya, Sri Lanka.
[http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JC14Df02.html]
Apart from many references to the injury sustained by the LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran in the course of an aerial bombardment in November 2007, there was some speculation that he may even have died. (Claims of Prabhakaran's death may be set to rest after Prabhakaran's "public appearance" at the funeral of the pro-LTTE Tamil National Alliance member of parliament, P Sivanesan, in the rebel-held Wanni area, of which the LTTE released photographs on March 9.
The details that embellish these reports, though ignored by spokesmen for the LTTE, have been refuted with disdain by several pro-LTTE writers. Given the questionable credibility of "news" originating from either side of the great divide, it has seldom been possible to sort out the truth from fiction in the stories on the Sri Lankan conflict.
What can, consequently, be attempted is to contextualize the recent surge of media attention on turbulence in the shrinking Tiger habitat of the "Vanni" in northern Sri Lanka, without speculating on whether its leader is dead or dying or hibernating prior to a deadly leap at the jugular. Then, the information must be synthesized into the situation that prevails at present, and taken from sources uncontaminated by propaganda.
In the checkered history of the LTTE, spanning the past three decades during which Prabhakaran has held sway as its supreme leader, there have been several spells during which its insurrectionary capacity suffered serious setbacks.
Prominent among such recessions were: the brief eclipse of the LTTE in the aftermath of the Indian peacekeeping intervention in 1987; the worldwide anti-Tiger sentiment evoked by the assassination of former Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991; the strategic losses stemming from its expulsion by the Sri Lankan armed forces from the Jaffna peninsula in 1995; the constraining effects on its international operations generated by the global tide of hostility towards terrorism following the al-Qaeda attack on the United States in 2001; and, more far-reaching in impact than any other, the internal revolt led by "Colonel Karuna" in March 2004.
The impression conveyed by the experiences in each of these episodes, however, is that the LTTE possessed the inner resilience and the external support required for recovery, if not entirely unscathed, at least with sufficient strength to persist with its campaign of warfare and terror. By contrast, the losses suffered in the more recent past appear to constitute an irreversible and aggravating trend featured by indications that could well portend a final collapse.
Despite the weakening of its grip on the eastern lowlands that resulted from the calamitous breakaway of the Karuna group, the LTTE leadership persisted with unswerving commitment to its goal of establishing a sovereign Tamil nation-state - Eelam - encompassing the entire northeast of Sri Lanka, the pledges of the ceasefire agreement of February 2000 notwithstanding.
As in earlier times, its efforts were directed mainly at enhancement of military strength, expanding the territory under its control in the Northern and Eastern provinces and eliminating its rivals in that part of the country, mobilizing international support for its cause, and destabilizing the government of Sri Lanka through carefully regulated intimidation and terror. Instigating a Sinhalese backlash of violence against the Tamils living outside the northeast - a re-enactment of 1983 - also remained a prime objective as was underscored by the assassination of Sri Lanka's charismatic foreign minister, Lakshman Kadirgamar, a provocative outrage committed in the final days of Chandrika Kumaratunga's presidential tenure.
Colombo-based politics of the country during this period remained in a state of flux, featured by both frequent changes of the power configuration as well as intense electoral rivalry. Given the fact that the release of the foreign aid pledged by the donors remained conditional on progress being made towards a negotiated settlement of the conflict, government policy had to accommodate two mutually conflicting needs - that of strengthening security and defense in the face of the mounting Tiger threat, and persistence with credible peace overtures to the LTTE. The latter encountered the almost insurmountable problem of fierce inter-party dissension on what could be offered to the Tigers without endangering the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka.
On the eve of the presidential election of November 2005, Prabhakaran enforced a boycott of the polls in the north and parts of the eastern lowlands where Ranil Wickremasinghe, former prime minister and a frontrunner of the presidential stakes, would have attracted substantially more support than his rival, Mahinda Rajapakse. This decision appears, in retrospect, to have been a monumental blunder that marks the onset of a drastic change in the fortunes of Prabhakaran's Eelam campaign. The boycott decision was evidently based on the premise that Wickremasinghe, hailed internationally as the "peace candidate", would, with his commitment to power-sharing under a federal system of government, place in serious jeopardy the case for a secessionist campaign.
Prabhakaran's expectation was that Rajapakse, backed as he was by electoral allies vehemently opposed to a political compromise involving devolution of power to the northeast, would actually attempt to implement his campaign pledges to jettison the ceasefire agreement, to evict the "White Tigers" (Norwegians) from their role as facilitators of peace negotiations, and to discard the notion of the LTTE being the sole representative of the Tamils. Such a hawkish approach, the LTTE leadership believed, would pave the way for a resumption of military confrontations in earnest, backed by vastly enhanced international sympathy and support for the rebels' cause.
Having contributed to Rajapakse's victory at the election, the LTTE leaders began to test the resolve of the new president. Thus, while articulating with greater vehemence than ever before their earlier demands for government intervention in disarming the Karuna group, and for constitutional power over the northeast pending a final resolution of the conflict, they launched a series of guerrilla attacks and acts of terrorism which, in April 2006, reached the heart of Colombo's defense establishment in the near-successful attempt to assassinate the Commander of the Sri Lanka Army, Lieutenant General Sarath Fonseka.
The sharply escalating level of violence did not evoke a retaliatory response from the government, at least for some time. Rajapakse persisted with his pursuit of peace, risking, in the process, the support of some of his parliamentary allies. He established an "All-Party Representative Committee" tasked with formulating constitutional reforms based on the axiom of devolution. He backed the Norwegian efforts at facilitating fresh peace negotiations, expressing a solemn hope that the brief meeting between delegates of the government and the LTTE, staged at Geneva in February 2006, would mark the resumption of a continuing dialogue with the Tiger leadership.
Rajapakse was also reported to have made a "secret" attempt to establish direct contact with the LTTE high command, knowing full well that the attempt would not be concealed from Sri Lanka's friends abroad. The intensifying LTTE violence, however, could not be ignored indefinitely.
From the commencement of Rajapakse's presidency up to the bomb attack on the army commander (approximately 150 days later), 150 armed services personnel, in addition to about 150 civilians, had been killed by the LTTE. The animosity between the LTTE and the security forces had reached such a fever pitch, and the nationalists' pressure for some retaliation had become so intense, that the president was eventually compelled to initiate a series of air strikes on identified LTTE bases.
Nevertheless, as the president had surmised, the continuing belligerence of the LTTE, on the one hand, and the show of restraint by the government, on the other, did resonate in the policy stances, vis-a-vis Sri Lanka, of several Western governments, both in a substantially enhanced flow of aid as well as in the imposition of sanctions on the LTTE, in member-states of the EU and in Canada in May-June 2006.
The repercussions of Prabhakaran's capricious gamble at the presidential polls soon instilled into his strategy a sense of desperation. This found expression in a series of "Sea Tiger" attacks (including an act of piracy) that evoked strictures from several quarters including the secretary general of the UN and the head of the Scandinavian "Ceasefire Monitoring Mission" stationed in Sri Lanka
Prabhakaran retaliated by demanding the removal of all non-Norwegian members of the Monitoring Mission from the northeast. The tempo of violence was increased further with a spate of attacks on military and civilian targets in all parts of the country. Then came the major military showdown in the eastern lowlands that began on July 20, 2006, in the form of a "riparian" confrontation in the irrigation channel system of Mavil Aru (south of Trincomalee) which compelled the government to retaliate in earnest, with a nod of approval from the US. Thereafter, following a series of bloody battles that lasted up until mid-2007 - in the course of which the LTTE incurred heavy losses - the rebels were finally evicted from the entire Eastern Province.
Throughout this period of intense military activity in the east, confrontations between the security forces and the LTTE elsewhere in the country took various forms. The Forward Defense Lines (FDL) of the government-controlled areas in the Jaffna peninsula and in the hinterland of Mannar continued to be venues of low intensity clashes, with occasional flare-ups.
In localities adjacent to the FDL in Vavuniya District, army killings of suspected insurgents and LTTE claymore-mine attacks and ambushes of army patrols occurred in routine fashion. The severe maritime losses suffered by the LTTE during these months included the sinking of 11 of its vessels off the east coast. Most significant, as an ingredient of the LTTE military debacle, was the destruction caused by the constant aerial bombardments in which Thamilchelvan, head of the LTTE's political wing, perished on November 3, 2007, and Prabhakaran suffered injury on November 27, 2007.
These military defeats constitute only one (albeit the key) component of the current LTTE crisis. The mutually interacting "external" misfortunes of the Tigers in the recent past include the death in December 2006 of Anton Balasingham, who had served for well over two decades as by far the most effective international spokesman and propagandist for the secessionist campaign.
The impact of the loss of its carefully nurtured image of invincibility has been even more profound, especially on the support from the expatriate Sri Lankan Tamil communities whose responses to fluctuating fortunes of the LTTE have never been devoid of elements typical of "cheer-squad" reactions.
Recent reports also indicate that the increasingly stringent enforcement of anti-terrorism regulations in some Western countries has curtailed both diaspora funding as well as other operations of LTTE agents and "front" outfits abroad. The crescendo of their desperate campaign for UN "humanitarian intervention" against the alleged proliferation of human rights violations in Sri Lanka has achieved a measure of success in generating external pressures against the country's war effort, but has had no mitigating effect on the pariah status of the Tigers.
Foremost among the internal causes for the present LTTE crisis is the prevailing trend towards factional disintegration of its leadership which, as the related evidence suggests, could well represent the emergence subterranean rivalries that had been in existence all along.
It may be recalled that the departure of Karuna caused a mini-purge in the Tiger leadership. Thereafter, when Thamilchelvan was killed in November 2007, certain critics (among them, S R Balasubramaniam, Congress Party leader in the Indian State of Tamil Nadu), cast doubt on the "official" explanation of the death, and pointed to the possibility of Thamilchelvan having been killed by Prabhakaran in the same way he had liquidated other potential rivals in the past.
In addition, throughout recent years, there has been the barely concealed animosity between two of the highest-ranking Tiger leaders - "Pottu Amman" (aka Shanmuganathan Sivasankaran, the feared head of the Tiger intelligence network whose spectacular "hits" include the masterminding of the Rajiv Gandhi assassination) and "Soosai" (aka Thillaiyampalan Sivanesan), the charismatic "Sea Tiger" admiral.
According to an analysis of this rivalry by the journalist D B S Jeyaraj, when Soosai (who had been accused by Pottu Amman of connivance with the renegade Karuna and the Indian external intelligence agency, Research and Analysis Wing - RAW)suffered serious injury in 2004 while engaged in a speed-boat maneuver (though the injury was officially attributed to an accident) the widespread and lingering belief within the LTTE that it was the consequence of an attempt by Pottu to murder Soosai had given rise to clashes among its rank and file which took a long time to subside.
Factional rivalries of this type in the Vanni and their repercussions outside the country are likely to intensify if, indeed, the reported weakening of Prabhakaran's grip over the LTTE is true.
Yet another internal dimension of the crisis is seen in the recent resurgence of several anti-LTTE political organizations among the Tamil community of Sri Lanka, most of which were reconciled to a shadowy existence in the heyday of the Tigers in the past.
Tamil critics of the LTTE have become bolder in expressing their views than ever before. Some among them repeatedly announced that the "Eelam" campaign is doomed. A distinction between the LTTE interests and those of the Tamils of Sri Lanka is being drawn with clarity and vehemence. There is also a publicly expressed suspicion that the recent spate of murders of several pro-LTTE activists operating outside the northeast represents the work of such organizations, the members of which rank among the innumerable victims of LTTE terror.
As a barrier to statutory recognition of the entire northeast as a ethnically distinctive entity (which, of course, constitutes the conceptual basis of the secessionist campaign), the Supreme Court announced on October 16, 2006, that the then-existing amalgamation of the Northern and Eastern provinces as a single unit of Provincial Government (a sequel to the Indo-Lanka Accord of 1987) had all along been constitutionally ultra vires. This is an even more insurmountable measure than the military eviction of the LTTE from the east.
The cumulative impact of these complex military and political defeats on the LTTE has been devastating, producing the most acute crisis of the group's existence. Sustained government operations in the north now have the capacity to inflict progressive damage on the rebel infrastructure and support base, increasingly undermining any residual potential for recovery and consolidation.
G H Peiris, professor emeritus of the University of Peradeniya, Sri Lanka.
[http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JC14Df02.html]
Tuesday, February 26, 2008
HELLO MULLAITHIVU...
Sri Lankan Defence Forces are within striking distance of the LTTE's main camp in Mullaithivu. Once the area is consolidated and mopping operations are completed, Mullaithivu would be recieving a baptism by fire...
END GAME
END GAME
Monday, February 18, 2008
DUTIES OF GOVERNMENT INCLUDE PUNISHING THE WICKED
The great Chinese strategist SUN-TZU said the following...;
...War may be defined as punishment, which is one of the
functions of government. It was the profession of Chung Yu
and Jan Ch`iu, both disciples of Confucius. Nowadays, the
holding of trials and hearing of litigation, the imprisonment
of offenders and their execution by flogging in the market-
place, are all done by officials. But the wielding of huge
armies, the throwing down of fortified cities, the hauling of
women and children into captivity, and the beheading of
traitors -- this is also work which is done by officials.
The objects of the rack and of military weapons are
essentially the same. There is no intrinsic difference
between the punishment of flogging and cutting off heads in
war. For the lesser infractions of law, which are easily
dealt with, only a small amount of force need be employed:
hence the use of military weapons and wholesale decapitation.
In both cases, however, the end in view is to get rid of
wicked people, and to give comfort and relief to the good....
In contemporary Sri Lanka, the struggle to deliver the democratic and pluralistic majority society's aspirations and desire for peaceful co-existance has necessitated the use of military action towards disarming of the Tamil terrorist group LTTE. It is the duty of those who wish to see a peaceful settlement within Sri Lanka that would allow all communities to prosper, to support the government in its endeavor.
...War may be defined as punishment, which is one of the
functions of government. It was the profession of Chung Yu
and Jan Ch`iu, both disciples of Confucius. Nowadays, the
holding of trials and hearing of litigation, the imprisonment
of offenders and their execution by flogging in the market-
place, are all done by officials. But the wielding of huge
armies, the throwing down of fortified cities, the hauling of
women and children into captivity, and the beheading of
traitors -- this is also work which is done by officials.
The objects of the rack and of military weapons are
essentially the same. There is no intrinsic difference
between the punishment of flogging and cutting off heads in
war. For the lesser infractions of law, which are easily
dealt with, only a small amount of force need be employed:
hence the use of military weapons and wholesale decapitation.
In both cases, however, the end in view is to get rid of
wicked people, and to give comfort and relief to the good....
In contemporary Sri Lanka, the struggle to deliver the democratic and pluralistic majority society's aspirations and desire for peaceful co-existance has necessitated the use of military action towards disarming of the Tamil terrorist group LTTE. It is the duty of those who wish to see a peaceful settlement within Sri Lanka that would allow all communities to prosper, to support the government in its endeavor.
Monday, February 11, 2008
DBS JEYARAJ TURNS COMEDIAN...AND HOW !
Here's a hoot of a nattami story...
Tigers Oust “King of Eelam” As TNA National List MP
February 9th, 2008
by D.B.S.Jeyaraj
February 9th, 2008
by D.B.S.Jeyaraj
MK Eelaventhan nominated as MP on the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) national list has been deprived of his Parliamentary membership. Eelaventhan which means “King of Eelam” had been in Parliament since 2004. A Muslim lawyer from Jaffna, Rizwan Mohammed Imam, has been appointed in his place.
Eelaventhan lost his seat in Parliament because he was absent without leave from Parliament for more than three months last year. The septuagenarian was away in North America for some months.He celebrated his 75th birthday in Canada during October last year. Upon his return to Colombo in early december Eelaventhan found himself disqualified on this procedural technicality.
Apparently Eelaventhan had informed his Parliamentary colleague from Batticaloa district, Kanagasabai, to seek an extension on his behalf. Eelaventhan was to return on Dec 4th.
According to TNA sources this was not done because a Parliamentary official had informed them that Eelaventhan had attended Parliament in October. This was not correct as Eelaventhan had been absent from last August
Eelaventhan returned and attended Parliament for three days in December. He even voted. It was then that a TNA colleague “tipped” off a Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna MP about Eelaventhan’s illegibility.
The JVP which hated Eelaventhan’s obnoxious antics promptly made it an issue. The TNA national list MP forfeited his seat.
Initially the man ranted and railed in the Tamil media saying he would sue the Parliamentary staff for their lapse in misinforming his party. However it was not a major problem as the party could always have re - nominated him.
This did not happen. Later there was media speculation that a Muslim was likely to be appointed in Eelaventhan’s place.
Again Eelaventhan told the Tamil media that he would file action against his party if he was not nominated again. This too did not happen.
Eelaventhan then went to the Wanni with his wife to plead his case before the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). He returned after a few days and became silent.
RM Imam whose name was on the TNA national list in 2004 was appointed and became Jaffna’s first Muslim MP.
Why was Eelaventhan’s Parliamentary career cut short midway without him completing the mandatory five years that would have entitled him to a pension? Why did he become silent after his trip to the Wanni?
EPDP leader Kathiravelu Devananda alias Douglas is fond of saying the TNA stands for Tiger nominated Agents. This is because of the control and authority wielded by the LTTE over the TNA.
There was a time during the ceasefire when the TNA would regularly go to Kilinochchi and get orders from their political masters.
Eelaventhan’s downfall was due to the LTTE becoming annoyed. It was the LTTE that got Eelaventhan appointed as MP in 2004. It was the LTTE that wanted Eelaventhan out of Parliament four years later.
When it became clear that the LTTE was calling the shots in his case the man and wife went up to Kilinochchi to plead with the tigers.
Eelaventhan then went to the Wanni with his wife to plead his case before the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). He returned after a few days and became silent.
RM Imam whose name was on the TNA national list in 2004 was appointed and became Jaffna’s first Muslim MP.
Why was Eelaventhan’s Parliamentary career cut short midway without him completing the mandatory five years that would have entitled him to a pension? Why did he become silent after his trip to the Wanni?
EPDP leader Kathiravelu Devananda alias Douglas is fond of saying the TNA stands for Tiger nominated Agents. This is because of the control and authority wielded by the LTTE over the TNA.
There was a time during the ceasefire when the TNA would regularly go to Kilinochchi and get orders from their political masters.
Eelaventhan’s downfall was due to the LTTE becoming annoyed. It was the LTTE that got Eelaventhan appointed as MP in 2004. It was the LTTE that wanted Eelaventhan out of Parliament four years later.
When it became clear that the LTTE was calling the shots in his case the man and wife went up to Kilinochchi to plead with the tigers.
Earlier when he went to the Wanni, Eelaventhan used to have one on one meetings with LTTE supremo Velupillai Prabakharan. This time he could not meet with senior tiger leaders let alone Prabakharan. It is not clear as to who the people he met were but they were not senior leaders.
At one point Eelaventhan’s wife got extremely emotional and argued strongly that her husband had been of yeoman service to the LTTE chief and that the tigers were being ungrateful. Irritated , the LTTE then informed the couple that their Pajeiro jeep was to be acquired by the movement.
Eelaventhan was one of the first TNA Parliamentarians to purchase a Pajeiro jeep. It was this vehicle that the LTTE now wanted for their own use.
The tigers then took the vehicle keys and vehicle - related documents. The dazed man and wife were curtly informed that the meeting was over. They were asked to make their way home sans the vehicle.
They were also ordered to return to Colombo immediately and keep mum. Eelaventhan returned to Colombo and enveloped himself in silence.
Interestingly the story of Eelaventhan’s discomfiture in Kilinochchi is being spread by none other than his erstwhile TNA parliamentary colleagues. At the Indian republic day reception Somasundaram Senathrajah alias “Mavai” Senathirajah was seen and heard regaling people with the tale of Eelaventhan’s downfall.
At one point Eelaventhan’s wife got extremely emotional and argued strongly that her husband had been of yeoman service to the LTTE chief and that the tigers were being ungrateful. Irritated , the LTTE then informed the couple that their Pajeiro jeep was to be acquired by the movement.
Eelaventhan was one of the first TNA Parliamentarians to purchase a Pajeiro jeep. It was this vehicle that the LTTE now wanted for their own use.
The tigers then took the vehicle keys and vehicle - related documents. The dazed man and wife were curtly informed that the meeting was over. They were asked to make their way home sans the vehicle.
They were also ordered to return to Colombo immediately and keep mum. Eelaventhan returned to Colombo and enveloped himself in silence.
Interestingly the story of Eelaventhan’s discomfiture in Kilinochchi is being spread by none other than his erstwhile TNA parliamentary colleagues. At the Indian republic day reception Somasundaram Senathrajah alias “Mavai” Senathirajah was seen and heard regaling people with the tale of Eelaventhan’s downfall.
Eelaventhan’s real name is Kanagendran. Eelaventhan is a pseudonym under which he writes and speaks. Eelaventhan means “King of Eelam”. Soon the name became popular and he became known as MK Eelaventhan. This native of Colombothurai in Jaffna was a translator at the Central bank. He identified himself with Tamil nationalism and was affected in the 1977 violence .
Eelaventhan is a maverick type of politico. He was an ardent supporter of the Federal Party but in 1968 - 70 broke ranks with the FP and supported V. Navaratna’s Tamil self - rule party. He returned to party folds and became president of the TULF colombo branch. He split again in the eighties and was a founder member of the Tamil Eelam Liberation Front (TELF).
Eelaventhan re - located to Chennai in 1982 with his family. He was associated closely with SC Chandrahasan the son of SJV Chelvanayagam. During this phase the man was opposed to the LTTE. After some years he fell out with Chandrahasan also. Thereafter he began drifting closer towards the LTTE.
He was jailed in 1997 in Madras on suspicion of procuring medicine and medical supplies for the LTTE and released later.
In 2000 Eelaventhan was forcibly deported to Sri Lanka from Tamil Nadu. He was charged of abusing his refugee status by engaging in anti - Indian and pro -tiger propaganda on Indian soil.
He began identifying with the LTTE openly after the 2002 ceasefire.
Eelaventhan is a maverick type of politico. He was an ardent supporter of the Federal Party but in 1968 - 70 broke ranks with the FP and supported V. Navaratna’s Tamil self - rule party. He returned to party folds and became president of the TULF colombo branch. He split again in the eighties and was a founder member of the Tamil Eelam Liberation Front (TELF).
Eelaventhan re - located to Chennai in 1982 with his family. He was associated closely with SC Chandrahasan the son of SJV Chelvanayagam. During this phase the man was opposed to the LTTE. After some years he fell out with Chandrahasan also. Thereafter he began drifting closer towards the LTTE.
He was jailed in 1997 in Madras on suspicion of procuring medicine and medical supplies for the LTTE and released later.
In 2000 Eelaventhan was forcibly deported to Sri Lanka from Tamil Nadu. He was charged of abusing his refugee status by engaging in anti - Indian and pro -tiger propaganda on Indian soil.
He began identifying with the LTTE openly after the 2002 ceasefire.
Eelaventhan made frequent trips and met with Prabakharan. Once he issued a press release about a discussion he had with the LTTE leader.
Diehard TULF supporters were angered by a reference in the statement which justified the killing of former opposition leader Appapillai Amirthalingam by the LTTE.
The loose coalition known as the Tamil National Alliance began playing a subservient role to the LTTE from 2001.The TULF, Tamil Congress, TELO and EPRLF came under the TNA umbrella. Only TULF President Veerasingham Anandasangaree refused to toe the LTTE line.
The TNA contested the 2004 elections on the Ilankai Thamil Arasu Katchi ticket. Eelaventhan’s elder son in law is Prof. Rajendran an Indian national.
Rajendran an ardent supporter of the Dravida Kazhagham once paid a visit to Kilinochchi in connection with a book release. Rajendran requested from Prabakharan that his father in law be given a MP seat for services rendered to the Tamil cause.
Former LTTE political strategist Anton Stanislaus Balasingham and ex - political commissar Suppiah Paramu Thamilselvan also supported Eelaventhan’s case. The tiger supremo gave the green signal. After decades of political activism the veteran Tamil nationalist entered Parliament for the first time.
Diehard TULF supporters were angered by a reference in the statement which justified the killing of former opposition leader Appapillai Amirthalingam by the LTTE.
The loose coalition known as the Tamil National Alliance began playing a subservient role to the LTTE from 2001.The TULF, Tamil Congress, TELO and EPRLF came under the TNA umbrella. Only TULF President Veerasingham Anandasangaree refused to toe the LTTE line.
The TNA contested the 2004 elections on the Ilankai Thamil Arasu Katchi ticket. Eelaventhan’s elder son in law is Prof. Rajendran an Indian national.
Rajendran an ardent supporter of the Dravida Kazhagham once paid a visit to Kilinochchi in connection with a book release. Rajendran requested from Prabakharan that his father in law be given a MP seat for services rendered to the Tamil cause.
Former LTTE political strategist Anton Stanislaus Balasingham and ex - political commissar Suppiah Paramu Thamilselvan also supported Eelaventhan’s case. The tiger supremo gave the green signal. After decades of political activism the veteran Tamil nationalist entered Parliament for the first time.
Despite his seniority Eelaventhan did not conduct himself with dignity or decorum. Though he did not engage in rowdyism like MK Sivajilingam or S. Gajendran , the new national list MP got involved in verbal duels that descended into shouting matches. Some of his statements were unnecessarily provocative and aroused the ire of the JVP.
Eelaventhan was also known for his absent mindedness. Once he mistakenly walked in to the chamber from the opposite side and sat down in the wrong seat on the side of the treasury benches. It took a while for him to realise his mistake. That too after jeering by some MP’s.
On another occasion he protested to the Speaker that Parliament had stopped simultaneous interpretation of proceedings into Tamil. Since that service had not been suspended Parliamentary officials were confused. It was later discovered that Eelaventhan had messed up with his ear phone controls. Though sheepish the man did not have the grace to apologize.
Being an impressive orator the man was much sought after by the Tamil Diaspora. He has travelled to many countries including Australia, South Africa, Malaysia and a lot of European Countries to address meetings.
One Country he wanted to visit badly was Canada where his sister lives now.Ultimately Eelaventhan’s fall from grace was due to his trip to Canada and USA.
Eelaventhan was also known for his absent mindedness. Once he mistakenly walked in to the chamber from the opposite side and sat down in the wrong seat on the side of the treasury benches. It took a while for him to realise his mistake. That too after jeering by some MP’s.
On another occasion he protested to the Speaker that Parliament had stopped simultaneous interpretation of proceedings into Tamil. Since that service had not been suspended Parliamentary officials were confused. It was later discovered that Eelaventhan had messed up with his ear phone controls. Though sheepish the man did not have the grace to apologize.
Being an impressive orator the man was much sought after by the Tamil Diaspora. He has travelled to many countries including Australia, South Africa, Malaysia and a lot of European Countries to address meetings.
One Country he wanted to visit badly was Canada where his sister lives now.Ultimately Eelaventhan’s fall from grace was due to his trip to Canada and USA.
Canada has for some time stopped issuing visas to TNA parliamentarians due to their links with the “terrorist” LTTE. Former Batticaloa MP Joseph Pararajasingham had been a frequent visitor to Canada as two of hic children live in the Toronto area. But he was denied a visa.
Suresh Premachandran’s wife and children live here but he has been denied a visa. Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam’s grandmother and aunts live here but he too is not given admission. People like Sivajilingam. Adaikkalanathan. Gajebdran, Padmini Sithambaranathan etc have all been refused visas in recent times.
The only TNA leader allowed to enter Canada in recent times was Trincomalee district MP R. Sambandan. He was given a special ministers permit in order to participate in meetings with Canadian foreign ministry officials. He was allowed to address a Trincomalee residents association meeting but debarred from participating in political meetings.
Against this backdrop it was indeed a wonder that Eelaventhan got his Canadian visa. He was invited as chief guest for a book release ceremony. The book was on deceptive practices in astrology.
Eelaventhan whose real name was Kanagendran had applied for his visa from Malaysia. He also travelled to Canada via a circuitous route through Japan.
Suresh Premachandran’s wife and children live here but he has been denied a visa. Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam’s grandmother and aunts live here but he too is not given admission. People like Sivajilingam. Adaikkalanathan. Gajebdran, Padmini Sithambaranathan etc have all been refused visas in recent times.
The only TNA leader allowed to enter Canada in recent times was Trincomalee district MP R. Sambandan. He was given a special ministers permit in order to participate in meetings with Canadian foreign ministry officials. He was allowed to address a Trincomalee residents association meeting but debarred from participating in political meetings.
Against this backdrop it was indeed a wonder that Eelaventhan got his Canadian visa. He was invited as chief guest for a book release ceremony. The book was on deceptive practices in astrology.
Eelaventhan whose real name was Kanagendran had applied for his visa from Malaysia. He also travelled to Canada via a circuitous route through Japan.
When he arrived at the Lester Pearson Airport in Toronto , Eelaventhan was detained by national security personnel for several hours. He was then allowed in with the condition that he refrains from addressing political meetings and engaging in LTTE related activity.
There was a possibility that Eelaventha’s admission was a trial balloon. If he conducted himself well there was a strong chance of visa restrictions being eased further by Canada for other TNA members..
Eelaventhan however conducted himself in a shameful manner. He involved himself openly with pro - tiger activity. He spoke at many LTTE gatherings and accompanied tiger operatives on fund raising missions. He was also interviewed frequently by LTTE media organs.
In an interview given to the LTTE’s “Thamil Solai” radio a day after the tiger attack on the Anuradhapura Air Base, Eelaventhan described TULF president Anandasangaree as a “rotting leper”.
He also said that traitors like Sangaree had to be exterminated and quoted two stanzas from the “Thirukkural”, One spoke of the need to pluck weeds to let plants grow,the other stated that sugar crane had to be crushed into pulp to obtain tasty juice.
TULF supporters in Toronto took recordings of the radio interview to Canadian law enforcing authorities. The officials assured them that Eelaventhan had stated that he would be leaving Canada on Dec 4th.
There was a possibility that Eelaventha’s admission was a trial balloon. If he conducted himself well there was a strong chance of visa restrictions being eased further by Canada for other TNA members..
Eelaventhan however conducted himself in a shameful manner. He involved himself openly with pro - tiger activity. He spoke at many LTTE gatherings and accompanied tiger operatives on fund raising missions. He was also interviewed frequently by LTTE media organs.
In an interview given to the LTTE’s “Thamil Solai” radio a day after the tiger attack on the Anuradhapura Air Base, Eelaventhan described TULF president Anandasangaree as a “rotting leper”.
He also said that traitors like Sangaree had to be exterminated and quoted two stanzas from the “Thirukkural”, One spoke of the need to pluck weeds to let plants grow,the other stated that sugar crane had to be crushed into pulp to obtain tasty juice.
TULF supporters in Toronto took recordings of the radio interview to Canadian law enforcing authorities. The officials assured them that Eelaventhan had stated that he would be leaving Canada on Dec 4th.
If he tried to stay on after that date action would be taken to deport him as an inadmissible person to Canada they said.
Though Eelaventhan’s conduct irritated Canadian officials it would have by no means angered the LTTE. How then did he fall foul of the LTTE resulting in the tigers coming down hard on him?
According to informed Tamil sources two chief reasons are attributed. One was his trip to the USA where Eelaventhan had made irresponsible comments about Sri Lanka, India and Ranil Wickremasinghe. He had also openly asked Tamils to donate money to the LTTE through the TRO.
This had upset many Tamil professionals in the USA who were nervous about a US crackdown. Several Tamils including the local LTTE chief Kandaswamy Karunakaran are in custody.
There is also a freeze on the TRO. Eelaventhan’s antis added more fuel to the fire. Many US Tamils had complained to the LTTE about this.
The more important reason was that in the LTTE’s perception Eelaventhan had disobeyed, defied and deceived them.
The LTTE helped Mahinda Rajapakse become President in 2005 through enforcing a boycott in the Tamil areas. Among other things the LTTE thought that a hard liner being in power was more favourable to them than some one like Ranil Wickremasinghe.
Though Eelaventhan’s conduct irritated Canadian officials it would have by no means angered the LTTE. How then did he fall foul of the LTTE resulting in the tigers coming down hard on him?
According to informed Tamil sources two chief reasons are attributed. One was his trip to the USA where Eelaventhan had made irresponsible comments about Sri Lanka, India and Ranil Wickremasinghe. He had also openly asked Tamils to donate money to the LTTE through the TRO.
This had upset many Tamil professionals in the USA who were nervous about a US crackdown. Several Tamils including the local LTTE chief Kandaswamy Karunakaran are in custody.
There is also a freeze on the TRO. Eelaventhan’s antis added more fuel to the fire. Many US Tamils had complained to the LTTE about this.
The more important reason was that in the LTTE’s perception Eelaventhan had disobeyed, defied and deceived them.
The LTTE helped Mahinda Rajapakse become President in 2005 through enforcing a boycott in the Tamil areas. Among other things the LTTE thought that a hard liner being in power was more favourable to them than some one like Ranil Wickremasinghe.
These calculations went awry. President Rajapakse is conducting relentless warfare against the tigers. In another exhibition of political clowning the LTTE which forced Tamils to boycott voting to get Rajapakse elected now wanted Tamil MP’s to vote against Mahinda to engineer his downfall.
With talk of a mass cross over from Govt ranks humming on the political grapevine the LTTE wanted all TNA Parliamentarians to vote against the Govt on Nov 19th during the vote on the budget second reading.
Eelaventhan in Canada was also instructed to return but the man dis - obeyed the diktat as he wanted to stay on till Dec 4th.. This was seen as defiance by the LTTE desperately trying to defeat Rajapakse on a money bill.
Aware that he had aroused tiger wrath, Eelaventhan tried to do some damage control. He made the cardinal error of trying to hoodwink the LTTE .
A news story was planted in overseas pro-tiger media about Eelaventhan having a one to one meeting with Canadaian Prime Minister Stephen Harper.
The news story stated that Eelaventhan had explained the Tamil problem to Harper and sought assistance. Harper had assured him that he would do all what he could.
With talk of a mass cross over from Govt ranks humming on the political grapevine the LTTE wanted all TNA Parliamentarians to vote against the Govt on Nov 19th during the vote on the budget second reading.
Eelaventhan in Canada was also instructed to return but the man dis - obeyed the diktat as he wanted to stay on till Dec 4th.. This was seen as defiance by the LTTE desperately trying to defeat Rajapakse on a money bill.
Aware that he had aroused tiger wrath, Eelaventhan tried to do some damage control. He made the cardinal error of trying to hoodwink the LTTE .
A news story was planted in overseas pro-tiger media about Eelaventhan having a one to one meeting with Canadaian Prime Minister Stephen Harper.
The news story stated that Eelaventhan had explained the Tamil problem to Harper and sought assistance. Harper had assured him that he would do all what he could.
A picture of Eelaventhan talking to harper was also published thereby adding more credibility.
For a few days the Tamil Diaspora in general and Canadian Tamils in particular were impressed by Eelaventhan’s feat. A one to one meeting with Prime Minister Harper to discuss the Tamil problem was a rare achievement indeed.
Even Kilinochchi may have for a while thought that Eelaventhan had done the right thing by staying on in Canada and meeting Harper.
But then the bubble burst! The truth was out!! What had happened was that Eelaventhan had gone with a few Canadian Tamils for a Conservative Party fund raiser banquet on Nov 8th. He was given 30 seconds to shake hands and pose for the camera with the Canadian PM.
Eelaventhan had used it to blurt out a minor speech very rapidly. A bewildered Harper could not even comprehend what this man was uttering at an incredible speed in English with a foreign accent.
At the end of it all Harper politely said he would do all he can and turned to the next in line for the photo opportunity.
This was all what happened. It was no big deal.
For a few days the Tamil Diaspora in general and Canadian Tamils in particular were impressed by Eelaventhan’s feat. A one to one meeting with Prime Minister Harper to discuss the Tamil problem was a rare achievement indeed.
Even Kilinochchi may have for a while thought that Eelaventhan had done the right thing by staying on in Canada and meeting Harper.
But then the bubble burst! The truth was out!! What had happened was that Eelaventhan had gone with a few Canadian Tamils for a Conservative Party fund raiser banquet on Nov 8th. He was given 30 seconds to shake hands and pose for the camera with the Canadian PM.
Eelaventhan had used it to blurt out a minor speech very rapidly. A bewildered Harper could not even comprehend what this man was uttering at an incredible speed in English with a foreign accent.
At the end of it all Harper politely said he would do all he can and turned to the next in line for the photo opportunity.
This was all what happened. It was no big deal.
But when Eelaventhan discovered that the LTTE was displeased over his disobedience he tried to pull a fast one over the tigers and Tamil Diaspora by publishing the picture and news item. It was an exercise in duplicity.
Eelaventhan’s deception was first exposed by California based entrepreneur and LTTE supporter Jayantha Gnanakone. Jayantha is the brother of Australia based Charles Gnanakone who was detained in connection with the Lakshman Kadirgamar murder and later released.
The tigers obviously were annoyed at Eelaventhan’s disobedience. But they were angered at the deception. Small wonder then that they wanted to penalise him by preventing his re- nomination.
The authoritarian LTTE does not tolerate defiance and when Eelaventhan’s wife spoke stridently on his behalf the vehicle too was seized as punishment.
So the :King of Eelam” is now in the doldrums. He is an avid reader and no doubt will spend his enforced leisure in reading books.
One book Eelaventhan may like to read is Goethe’s Dr. Faustus. It may help him to ponder over the fate awaiting those who strike bargains with the Devil for worldly success!.
Eelaventhan’s deception was first exposed by California based entrepreneur and LTTE supporter Jayantha Gnanakone. Jayantha is the brother of Australia based Charles Gnanakone who was detained in connection with the Lakshman Kadirgamar murder and later released.
The tigers obviously were annoyed at Eelaventhan’s disobedience. But they were angered at the deception. Small wonder then that they wanted to penalise him by preventing his re- nomination.
The authoritarian LTTE does not tolerate defiance and when Eelaventhan’s wife spoke stridently on his behalf the vehicle too was seized as punishment.
So the :King of Eelam” is now in the doldrums. He is an avid reader and no doubt will spend his enforced leisure in reading books.
One book Eelaventhan may like to read is Goethe’s Dr. Faustus. It may help him to ponder over the fate awaiting those who strike bargains with the Devil for worldly success!.
Sunday, January 27, 2008
MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR SUICIDE BOMBERS TO HIDE BOMBS
..Make all Sri Lankan women wear clothing that makes it impossible to conceal bombs.
Here are our in house counter-terrorism expert's recommendations
These two suicide bombers were neutralized by the Lankaenews folks...
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