Paper Number 426 , 15.03.2002
Sri Lanka: Cease-fire agreement and prospects for peace
by Dr. S. Chandrasekharan
Setting: To understand the Cease-fire agreement, one should go back to the Sri Lankan elections of 5th December, 2001 which threw up two challenges:
* A test on the current Constitution- a powerful executive President from one Party who is sulking with a powerful parliament led by Prime minister of another party.
* A consolidation of the Tamil view point.
These two developments will have a serious impact on the ongoing ethnic crisis and perhaps the challenges themselves could be seen as opportunities to solve the vexing problem.
The election itself was one of the most violent ones in Sri Lankan history with over 2000 incidents and 40 deaths. Both the leaders Chandrika and Ranil freely traded charges before the elections and this further exacerbated the already tenuous relationship between the two
Confrontation or Cohabitation?: This was the choice before the two leaders and both do not seem to have reconciled themselves to the situation where they will have to work together in unison to solve the ethnic problem.
Unlike in the past, the four party alliance (TNA) of non LTTE parties aligned itself fully with the LTTE and won 15 seats on an election plank which called for the deproscription of the LTTE, to let the LTTE participate in the Peace talks as the sole representative of the Tamils and the intervention of a third party.
Cease-fire interregnum before the MOU: Soon after elections the LTTE first declared cease-fire from 24th December and extended by one month and the Sri Lankan government reciprocated. The cease fire could at best be described as unstable with both sides complaining of violations. There were allegations that the LTTE continued to import arms and that in one of the last instances there was a major clash off Mullaithivu coast between Sri Lankan Navy and the Sea Tigers on the 19th night- that is after Prabakaran signed the draft cease-fire agreement.
The Cease-fire agreement brokered by Norway entered into force on 23rd Feb. The gainer was the LTTE.
The agreement has many fuzzy areas and worse still, the Sri Lankan Prime Minister does not seem to have taken the President into confidence before initialling it. Some of the disputed points which may give rise to different interpretations are -
* The text does not specifically deal with the recruitment of children by the LTTE. There have been allegations in the past of forcible kidnapping and recruitment.
* While acknowledging the legitimacy of Sri Lankan forces to safe guard the sovereignty, both parties are free to move arms, equipment and ammunition within the areas controlled by them. The question then is- Can the LTTE import arms and ammunition into the territory controlled by them for e.g. the entire Mullaithivu coast which is under the control of LTTE. ? We quote Balasingham here-he said " We wish to impress upon him ( Kadirgamar - former foreign minister) that sovereignty denotes the supreme power of the people, not an inalienable divine right of the state."
* Perhaps the most controversial provision will be the disarming of Tamil Para military groups now supporting the Sri Lankan government. The agreement envisages no space for the non LTTE groups. While the LTTE is free to move all over Tamil areas including areas controlled by the Sri Lankan army, there is no mention whether non LTTE groups like EPDP and Varada Raja Perumal’s faction of EPRLF could do political work in LTTE controlled areas. There is no presence of monitoring team either in the LTTE controlled areas of Killinochi and Mullaithivu areas- the result- slowly but surely LTTE will emerge as the unchallenged ruler of Tamils.
* The most significant achievement of LTTE will be in regaining control of Jaffna. The Sri Lankan army will go back into their barracks after vacating all public buildings and there will be no offensive patrolling either. The LTTE will take complete political control of the district. Significantly their first office in Jaffna was opened at Tiruneveli- a place which attained prominence when the ambush of LTTE killing 13 soldiers triggered the state wide riots of 1983.
Prospects for Peace: It looks that Wickremesinghe in his over anxiety for peace has thrown caution to the winds. The agreement gives the impression of the LTTE being the victor and has unwittingly given the Norwegians a role from that of a facilitator to one of mediator and arbitrator.
On the cease fire agreement itself, both sides appear to have different perceptions.
* The Sri Lankan government looks at it as a precursor for talks that should start early. That in their view would test the sincerity of LTTE whether they are genuinely interested in a solution or not. But the Prime minister himself has thrown the spanner by declaring even before the talks that agreement with LTTE will be placed before the people for a referendum which he himself knows will never succeed!
* On the other hand the LTTE looks at the cease fire as an end in itself. See the statements of some of the leaders. Balasingham- the cease fire agreement " is one (of)gradual de-escalation and bringing about the normalisation of civilian life in the north east." Tamil Chelvan" Talks could begin once living conditions had improved and the government lifted its ban" on the LTTE." The agreement called for an improvement of the living conditions of the people living in the north and east." Thus the normalisation norms themselves will become a subject of dispute before talks begin.
Another significant response of Tamil Chelvan whether the LTTE had given up its demand for Eelam was that it would depend upon "if the government can put forward proposals to fulfill the aspirations of the Tamil." This has been the standard phraseology of LTTE throughout and to say that the LTTE had changed its position on Eelam and that it was willing to work under a united Sri Lanka, appears far fetched.
The maximum the Sri Lankan government had offered to the Tamils was in 1995 when Chandrika at the height of popularity with Tamils, had made some proposals which went up to a kind of "regional configuration." Unfortunately this got whittled down progressively.
Imagine a situation now and hereafter when the LTTE is in total control of a sizeable territory of the north east with a line of control, check posts to monitor entry and exit, with freedom for the group to do whatever it likes. They will also have progressively political, economic and cultural control over rest of the Tamil territories too. What they have now is more than what was offered in 1995. Will they accept anything less? And why should they?
Sri Lanka: Cease-fire agreement and prospects for peace
by Dr. S. Chandrasekharan
Setting: To understand the Cease-fire agreement, one should go back to the Sri Lankan elections of 5th December, 2001 which threw up two challenges:
* A test on the current Constitution- a powerful executive President from one Party who is sulking with a powerful parliament led by Prime minister of another party.
* A consolidation of the Tamil view point.
These two developments will have a serious impact on the ongoing ethnic crisis and perhaps the challenges themselves could be seen as opportunities to solve the vexing problem.
The election itself was one of the most violent ones in Sri Lankan history with over 2000 incidents and 40 deaths. Both the leaders Chandrika and Ranil freely traded charges before the elections and this further exacerbated the already tenuous relationship between the two
Confrontation or Cohabitation?: This was the choice before the two leaders and both do not seem to have reconciled themselves to the situation where they will have to work together in unison to solve the ethnic problem.
Unlike in the past, the four party alliance (TNA) of non LTTE parties aligned itself fully with the LTTE and won 15 seats on an election plank which called for the deproscription of the LTTE, to let the LTTE participate in the Peace talks as the sole representative of the Tamils and the intervention of a third party.
Cease-fire interregnum before the MOU: Soon after elections the LTTE first declared cease-fire from 24th December and extended by one month and the Sri Lankan government reciprocated. The cease fire could at best be described as unstable with both sides complaining of violations. There were allegations that the LTTE continued to import arms and that in one of the last instances there was a major clash off Mullaithivu coast between Sri Lankan Navy and the Sea Tigers on the 19th night- that is after Prabakaran signed the draft cease-fire agreement.
The Cease-fire agreement brokered by Norway entered into force on 23rd Feb. The gainer was the LTTE.
The agreement has many fuzzy areas and worse still, the Sri Lankan Prime Minister does not seem to have taken the President into confidence before initialling it. Some of the disputed points which may give rise to different interpretations are -
* The text does not specifically deal with the recruitment of children by the LTTE. There have been allegations in the past of forcible kidnapping and recruitment.
* While acknowledging the legitimacy of Sri Lankan forces to safe guard the sovereignty, both parties are free to move arms, equipment and ammunition within the areas controlled by them. The question then is- Can the LTTE import arms and ammunition into the territory controlled by them for e.g. the entire Mullaithivu coast which is under the control of LTTE. ? We quote Balasingham here-he said " We wish to impress upon him ( Kadirgamar - former foreign minister) that sovereignty denotes the supreme power of the people, not an inalienable divine right of the state."
* Perhaps the most controversial provision will be the disarming of Tamil Para military groups now supporting the Sri Lankan government. The agreement envisages no space for the non LTTE groups. While the LTTE is free to move all over Tamil areas including areas controlled by the Sri Lankan army, there is no mention whether non LTTE groups like EPDP and Varada Raja Perumal’s faction of EPRLF could do political work in LTTE controlled areas. There is no presence of monitoring team either in the LTTE controlled areas of Killinochi and Mullaithivu areas- the result- slowly but surely LTTE will emerge as the unchallenged ruler of Tamils.
* The most significant achievement of LTTE will be in regaining control of Jaffna. The Sri Lankan army will go back into their barracks after vacating all public buildings and there will be no offensive patrolling either. The LTTE will take complete political control of the district. Significantly their first office in Jaffna was opened at Tiruneveli- a place which attained prominence when the ambush of LTTE killing 13 soldiers triggered the state wide riots of 1983.
Prospects for Peace: It looks that Wickremesinghe in his over anxiety for peace has thrown caution to the winds. The agreement gives the impression of the LTTE being the victor and has unwittingly given the Norwegians a role from that of a facilitator to one of mediator and arbitrator.
On the cease fire agreement itself, both sides appear to have different perceptions.
* The Sri Lankan government looks at it as a precursor for talks that should start early. That in their view would test the sincerity of LTTE whether they are genuinely interested in a solution or not. But the Prime minister himself has thrown the spanner by declaring even before the talks that agreement with LTTE will be placed before the people for a referendum which he himself knows will never succeed!
* On the other hand the LTTE looks at the cease fire as an end in itself. See the statements of some of the leaders. Balasingham- the cease fire agreement " is one (of)gradual de-escalation and bringing about the normalisation of civilian life in the north east." Tamil Chelvan" Talks could begin once living conditions had improved and the government lifted its ban" on the LTTE." The agreement called for an improvement of the living conditions of the people living in the north and east." Thus the normalisation norms themselves will become a subject of dispute before talks begin.
Another significant response of Tamil Chelvan whether the LTTE had given up its demand for Eelam was that it would depend upon "if the government can put forward proposals to fulfill the aspirations of the Tamil." This has been the standard phraseology of LTTE throughout and to say that the LTTE had changed its position on Eelam and that it was willing to work under a united Sri Lanka, appears far fetched.
The maximum the Sri Lankan government had offered to the Tamils was in 1995 when Chandrika at the height of popularity with Tamils, had made some proposals which went up to a kind of "regional configuration." Unfortunately this got whittled down progressively.
Imagine a situation now and hereafter when the LTTE is in total control of a sizeable territory of the north east with a line of control, check posts to monitor entry and exit, with freedom for the group to do whatever it likes. They will also have progressively political, economic and cultural control over rest of the Tamil territories too. What they have now is more than what was offered in 1995. Will they accept anything less? And why should they?
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