LTTE's tincan aircraft managed to slip through not a defective defensive network, but a defective offensive thinking network, and as a result Sri Lanka found itself with its ass hanging out in public.
Scattered news items from various sources are starting to piece together an ugly picture of incompetency which is now starting to become not only worrisome, but also extremely irritating. While the SLAF rushed around trying to blame the escape of the air borne terrorists on the failure of infra-red heat seeking missiles on board the F7G interceptor to get a lock on, the whole interception attempt appears to have been a muddle of errors from start to finish.
First of all, there's the question of whether or when the SLAF became aware of the air borne threat. Though some media tries to comfortingly explain that the terrorists were under the surveillance of multiple radar systems at all times, the fact remains that the SLAF's F7Gs were directed to head out to the Wanni and bomb potential landing sites, instead of attempting to take down the LTTE aircraft using guns in the event the missiles failed. If the enemy was under radar surveillance, the SLAF air traffic controllers should have been able to direct interceptors to the target aircraft precisely. Going by a timeline that is gradually starting to emerge, it appears as though the SLAF bombed the LTTE's known landing site long before the Zlin aircraft even managed to arrive at the Kelanitissa power station and drop bombs causing over approx Rs.100million in damages. It is very doubtful whether the F7G and the Zlin ever shared airspace close enough for the SLAF aircraft to even try to get a lock on.
A further worrisome news that has surfaced and is making the rounds of opposition leaning news media says the SLAF was not even aware of the LTTE aircraft activity until security personnel from the President's House called them. If this is true, communication systems, the chain of command and crissis management in the SLAF is definitely due for a serious overhaul.
It is not only time to find answers to the question as to what really went wrong the night the SLAF completely bungled the LTTE interception, but more importantly, to take serious decisions and implement changes that are quite obviously needed at the heirarchical levels of the SL Air Force.
Scattered news items from various sources are starting to piece together an ugly picture of incompetency which is now starting to become not only worrisome, but also extremely irritating. While the SLAF rushed around trying to blame the escape of the air borne terrorists on the failure of infra-red heat seeking missiles on board the F7G interceptor to get a lock on, the whole interception attempt appears to have been a muddle of errors from start to finish.
First of all, there's the question of whether or when the SLAF became aware of the air borne threat. Though some media tries to comfortingly explain that the terrorists were under the surveillance of multiple radar systems at all times, the fact remains that the SLAF's F7Gs were directed to head out to the Wanni and bomb potential landing sites, instead of attempting to take down the LTTE aircraft using guns in the event the missiles failed. If the enemy was under radar surveillance, the SLAF air traffic controllers should have been able to direct interceptors to the target aircraft precisely. Going by a timeline that is gradually starting to emerge, it appears as though the SLAF bombed the LTTE's known landing site long before the Zlin aircraft even managed to arrive at the Kelanitissa power station and drop bombs causing over approx Rs.100million in damages. It is very doubtful whether the F7G and the Zlin ever shared airspace close enough for the SLAF aircraft to even try to get a lock on.
A further worrisome news that has surfaced and is making the rounds of opposition leaning news media says the SLAF was not even aware of the LTTE aircraft activity until security personnel from the President's House called them. If this is true, communication systems, the chain of command and crissis management in the SLAF is definitely due for a serious overhaul.
It is not only time to find answers to the question as to what really went wrong the night the SLAF completely bungled the LTTE interception, but more importantly, to take serious decisions and implement changes that are quite obviously needed at the heirarchical levels of the SL Air Force.
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